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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States, throughout its history, has imposed substantial legal
impediments to the integration within a firm of both banking and nonbanking
businesses. This policy-often called the separation of banking and commerce-
ranks among the most enduring doctrines in Anglo-American financial regulation,
with a genealogy that extends almost three hundred years under English law.,
In the United States, the separation is maintained by numerous state and federal
laws that elaborate upon their historical English antecedents.2 Despite its advanced
age, the separation maintains considerable vitality, and the last half century of
banking law in the United States has been marked by progressive expansion
and refinement of the separation. 3 Even in the current climate of skepticism
about economic regulation by academics and policymakers, the separation con-
tinues to attract a substantial degree of uncritical support among both scholars
4
and legislators.' Indeed, when the outgoing chairman of the Federal Deposit
1. See infra text accompanying notes 79-167 (discussing the historical purposes of sep-
aration). Similar, but unrelated, restrictions existed in continental Europe as early as the fourteenth
century. See Salley, Origins of the Regulatory Separation of Banking and Commerce, 93 BANKING
L. 1. 196 (1976) (summarizing early governmental regulation in the Italian states and Catalonia).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 20-78 (discussing the legal prohibitions on non-
banking business in the United States).
3. The primary legislative vehicles for the development of the separation in this century
have been the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.) (the Glass-Steagall Act), which separated commercial and investment banking, the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
1841-1850 (1982)) (the BHCA), which barred multi-bank holding companies from engagement
in or ownership of businesses not "closely related to banking," and the Bank Holding Company
Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-
1850, 1971-1978 (1982)), which extended the BHCA restrictions to holding companies owning
or controlling a single bank. As recently as 1982, the separation was enlarged further by enactment
of the Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 601, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 216-216d (1982)) (the Garn-Saint Germain Act), which closed most insurance businesses
to bank holding companies. See infra text accompanying notes 79-167 (discussing more fully
the Glass-Steagall Act and the two bank holding company acts).
4. See, e.g., E. SymoNs & J. WrTE, TEACHING MATERIALS O N BANKING LAW 377 (2d.
ed. 1984) (arguing that the separation is justified by historical experience); Salley, supra note
1, at 196-98 (discussing the continued strength of the separation); Shull, The Separation of
Banking and Commerce, 28 Antitrust Bull. 255, 275-77 (1983) (expressing concerns about the
effects of the erosion of separation on private entrepreneurs). Other commentators have criticized
existing law as unduly restrictive and championed expanded bank powers, but would include
only financial or investment services. See, e.g., Harfield, Sermon on Genesis 17:20; Exodus
1:10, 85 BANKING L.J. 565, 578 (1968) (maintaining that banks should be allowed to provide
any service related to money and credit).
5. At this moment, despite pressures from the banking industry and the Reagan ad-
ministration, it is considerably more likely that the separation will be strengthened than weakened.
Congressional support for the separation remains strong, partricularly in the House of Repre-
sentatives. During the 1986 term, Senator Garn dropped provisions intended to expand bank
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Insurance Corporation (FDIC) suggested to the usually austere Senate Banking
Committee that the separation be relaxed, his comment provoked "uproarious
laughter." 6
This continuing vitality begs examination. The legal separation of banking
and commerce has persisted despite some obvious disadvantages: it prevents the
development of integrated banking and nonbanking firms that could operate
more efficiently than fragmented enterprises; it burdens bank customers by
requiring them to divide related transactions among unrelated vendors; and it
precludes banks from engaging in equity finance even when desirable both to
the bank and to its customers. 7 Whether these costs are offset by countervailing
benefits is problematic, but the experience in the United States and abroad
provides grounds for skepticism. Most other countries with well developed capital
markets either do not enforce the separation of banking and commerce or have
significantly less restrictive enforcement than the United States, without apparent
adverse effects." Even in the United States, the body of law that effects the
separation is complex and incomplete, and provides for disparate treatment of
the various forms of depository institutions and modes of integration. The failure
of these anomalies to erode over time suggests that the policy is not fundamental
to sound capital markets.
The accelerating pace of change within the financial services industry un-
derscores the importance of inquiry into the purposes and justifications for the
separation of banking and commerce. In the past decade, most of the once
great investment houses of Wall Street have either merged or have become
powers from his proposed bill, and the succession of Senator Proxmire-an opponent of non-
financial bank powers-to the chairmanship of the Senate Banking and Finance Committee
makes the chance of liberalizing reforms even more remote. See Garn Scuttles Plans for Com-
prehensive Bill, Plans Vote on Pared-Down Measure, 47 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 197
(Aug. 11, 1986). Among regulators, there has been considerable sentiment for augmenting present
legal restrictions preventing bank engagement in nonfinancial businesses. See, e.g., Statement
by Paul Volker, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, Apr. 17, 1985, reprinted in 71 Fed. Reserve Bull., No. 6, 424 (June 1985) (supporting
proposals to prevent evasion of the separation of banking and commerce).
6. FDIC Chief Isaac's Departure Viewed as a Sign that Deregulation's Time has Come
and Gone, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1985, at 60, col. 1.
7. There are less obvious costs. See infra text accompanying notes 189-231 (identifying
and assessing the costs of the separation).
8. See Goodman, Cumming & Kumekawa, Product Line Regularions for Financial In-
stitutions: A Cross Country Comparison, in Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure
and Competition, at 79 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago 1984) (surveying product line restrictions
in West Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan). According to Goodman,
Cumming, and Kumekawa, all the surveyed countries, except Japan, exerted significantly less
restrictive regulation of the commercial activities of banks than the United States. Japan presents
an exceptional case because the United States compelled the disaggregation of large integrated
financial and industrial holding companies, the Zaibatsu, following World War II. Notwith-
standing the voluntary enactment of legal regulations that are nearly identical to United States
law, the relationship between commercial enterprises and banks is considerably closer in Japan
than in this country. Moreover, unlike United States banks, which generally may not own equity
in nonbanking corporations, Japanese banks can own up to 10% of the outstanding stock of
a corporation (to be reduced to 5% under current law) and may exercise significant influence
over the corporation's affairs. Id. at 100-03; see also W. Oucm, THE M-FORM SOCIETY 65-81
(1984) (discussing benefits of equity ownership by Japanese banks).
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subsidiaries of industrial corporations. 9 Financial conglomerates offering a range
of financial products have appeared, 0 and the walls constraining the geographical
expansion of banks have been breached." Commercial banks have exhibited
unprecedented vitality in exploring the limits of their legal powers, and a wave
of bank consolidations has increased significantly the dominance of the largest
bank organizations."2
This Article closely examines the separation of banking and commerce,
identifies the separation's purposes, and evaluates the fit between its means and
ends with the objective of promoting the rationalization of bank regulatory
policy. First, this Article briefly sketches relevant current banking law.
3 Second,
this Article exhumes the historical purposes of the principal relevant federal laws
and analyzes these purposes through the conceptual lenses of law 
and economics.' 4
The separation initially was copied from English law and subsequently was
expanded for two principal reasons: to relieve bank panics and, later, to alleviate
the perceived tendency of the financial sector to assume unacceptable levels of
economic aggregation and power." This Article concludes that neither of these
historical purposes justifies incurring the costs of existing law.'
6 Third, this
Article broadens the inquiry to consider the proposition of some contemporary
banking experts that the separation is desirable to counter a tendency of federally
insured banks to undertake excessive risks. 1
7 While it is true the separation
probably reduces the incidence of bank failure, the welfare significance of this
effect is ambiguous. Last, this Article elaborates on the preceding section by
attempting to weigh approximately the costs and benefits of the separation
8 and
by considering alternative regulatory strategies.1
9
II. LEGAL PROInBITIONS ON NONBANKING BusinEss
United States banking law has been described as unparalleled "in terms of
complexity, confusion, irrationality, and difficulty. of administration"
0 and as
9. Of the seventeen great investment houses whose histories are traced in United States
v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 655-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), only two, Morgan Stanley and Goldman,
Sachs, continue as independent entities, and even Goldman, Sachs agreed to sell substantial
equity interest to Sumitomo Bank of Japan. See Proposed Investment by Sumitomo Bank Deemed
Consistent with Bank Holding Company Act, 73 Fed. Reserve Bull., No. 1, 24 (Jan. 1987).
10. See R. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BAN;s Do? 44-47 (1987) (describing the rise of financial
supermarkets).
11. See Savage, Interstate Banking Developments, 73 Fed. Reserve Bull. No. 2, 79, 80
(Feb. 1987) (discussing the continued deregulation of geographic expansion by banking organ-
izations).
12. Between 1975 and 1985, the share of total domestic banking assets held by the 100
largest banking organizations in the United States rose from 50.807o to 57.7%. Id. at 90. In
contrast, from 1970 to 1975, the share remained virtually constant, rising only .40. Id.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 20-78.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 79-167.
15. Id.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 150-167.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 168-188.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 194-239.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 240-243.
20. S. HUBEk, BANK OFFICER's HANDBOOK OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION 1 1.01121 (1984)
(quoting Robertson, Federal Regulation of Banking: A Plea for Unification, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 673, 673 (1966)).
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"intricate and baffling." '2' Banks are subject to an elaborate system of regulation
involving numerous and overlapping federal and state authorities.2 A bank may
choose to charter under either state or federal law and, in many states, may
"flip" between federal and state status.23 If a bank charters under federal law,
it is subject to the National Bank Act (the NBA),24 and its primary regulator
is the Comptroller of the Currency. National banks must join the Federal Reserve
System and obtain deposit insurance from the FDIC.21 Banks opting for a state
charter are subject to state law and are supervised principally by state banking
authorities. In most states, a state bank must insure with the FDIC.2 Virtually
all banks have elected to obtain FDIC coverage, even where it is not mandatory. 27
In addition, a state bank voluntarily may choose to join the Federal Reserve
System and become subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve
Board (the Board). 8 The Board becomes the primary federal regulatory authority
for such state member banks; nonmember insured banks are primarily supervised
at the federal level by the FDIC.
Bank holding companies-corporations, partnerships, and long-lived trusts
that control one or more banks-also are subject to overlapping federal and
state regulation. The federal Bank Holding Company Act (the BHCA)29 imposes
voluminous substantive and disclosure requirements on all bank holding com-
21. C. GOLEMBE & D. HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING, 1983-1984, at 1 (1983).
22. See generally Office of the Vice-President, Blueprint for Reform: The Report of the
Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services (July 1984) [hereinafter Vice-President's Task
Group Report] (briefly describing the existing regulatory system); see also S. HUBER, supra note
20, 11 3.01-4.08 (providing a detailed description of banking activities supervised by multiple
regulatory authorities). Other depository institutions-savings and loan associations, mutual
savings banks not regulated as commercial banks, and credit unions-are subject to similar, butnot identical, regulatory systems. While this Article will focus primarily on commercial banks,
its analysis should apply with equal force to savings and loan associations and savings banks-
collectively, "thrifts."
23. This dual system of banking regulation has been the subject of both praise and
condemnation. To its partisans, the system is a logical analog of constitutional checks and
balances, protecting depository institutions from regulatory excesses by permitting exit form one
regulatory jurisdiction to another. To its detractors, the dual system promotes an unhealthy
competition in regulatory laxity by giving excessive leverage to regulated financial companies.
See Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1977) (discussing the operation of the dual system and its policy consequences); see also
Niskanen, Commentary on Scott, The Dual Banking System, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION
46 (F. Edwards ed. 1979) (presenting a Chicago-style critique of the dual system).
24. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-
216d (1982)).
25. 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1982).
26. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 658.22 (1985) (providing for revocation of state bank charter
approval for failure to obtain FDIC insurance of deposits).
27. As of December 31, 1983, only 677 of the 15,440 banks and trust companies in the
United States were uninsured and 123 of these were nondepository institutions. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Changes Among Operating Banks and Branches: FDIC 1983, Table 1,
at 4 (1984). As of that date, uninsured institutions accounted for only 287 bank branches of
a total of 43,610 branches nationwide. Id. at 6.
28. See 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1982) (listing the procedures for membership application). As
of June 30, 1985, approximately 11% of state commercial banks with almost 37% of the total
state commercial bank assets were members of the Federal Reserve System. Ann. Report of the
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 1985, Table 16, at 229 [hereinafter 1985 Fed. Reserve
Ann. Report].
29. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982).
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panies, whether they control a federal or state chartered bank, and subjects
them to the regulatory supervision of the Board. The "separation of banking
and commerce," as used in this Article, denotes three categories of restrictions
on bank conduct embedded within this regulatory matrix: (1) prohibitions on
direct engagement in nonbanking activities by banks and subsidiaries of banks;
(2) prohibitions on investments by banks in nonbanking business; and (3) pro-
hibitions on engagement in businesses unrelated to banking by bank holding
companies and their affiliates.
A. Restrictions on Nonbanking Activities of Banks
1. National Banks
National banks are limited by the NBA to the exercise of "such incidental
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking"
30 plus a few
additional expressly granted statutory powers.
3' They also are subject to provisions
of the Glass-Steagall Act
32 that bar them from engaging in most underwriting
activities 33 or operating a full-time service stock brokerage.
34 These restrictions
apply to bank subsidiaries, except that a small fraction of bank assets may be
invested in a subsidiary with the somewhat broader powers permitted a bank
holding company affiliate.
3
The precise ambit of "the business of banking" for the purposes of the
NBA is disputed.36 Contemporary courts, however, generally have applied a
30. Id. § 24.
31. Express powers include government depository functions, id. § 90, and trust powers,
id. § 92a. A provision in 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1982) that permitted national banks doing business
in communities with less than five thousand residents to act as insurance agents and to 
broker
real estate loans apparently was repealed inadvertantly by omission from the 1918 recodification
of federal statutes. See codification note, 12 U.S.C.A. § 92 (West Supp. 1987). Nevertheless,
the provision generally is treated as though it still were in force, perhaps on the theory 
that it
was reenacted implicitly by the Garn-Saint Germain Act, which purported to amend it.
32. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
33. 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 378 (1982). Important exceptions are made for the securities 
of
the United States Treasury, general obligation state and local bond issues, and issues of certain
government and quasi-government agencies. Id. § 24.
34. Id. § 24.
35. The NBA prohibits ownership of equity securities by national banks, except as provided
by statute or regulation. Id. Equity ownership of only two categories of subsidiaries has been
authorized. First, the Comptroller by regulation permits banks "to engage in activities which
are a part of or are incidental to the business of banking" through subsidiary corporations, 
so
long as the parent bank owns at least 80% of the voting stock of the subsidiary. 12 C.F.R. §
5.34 (1987). Second, a national bank may invest up to 5% of its total assets in one or more
"bank service corporations." 12 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982). Such corporations may engage only 
in
specified services for depository institutions or in lines of business permitted national banks 
or
permitted bank holding companies by regulation of the Board pursuant to § 4(c)(8) of 
the
BHCA. Id. §§ 1863-1864; see infra text accompanying notes 64-78 (discussing § 4(c)(8) powers).
Investment by a national bank in a bank service corporation engaged in certain activities requires
the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency or the Board. Id. § 1865.
36. See generally Beatty, What are the Legal Limits to the Expansion of National Bank
Services?, 86 BANKING L.J. 3 (1969) (explaining how rules have changed with changing conditions);
Harfield, supra note 4, at 571-80 (proposing a test for permissible bank services based 
on
whether the business is related to "money and credit" and involves only "credit risk"); Huck,
What is the Banking Business?, 21 Bus. LAW 537 (1966) (discussing controversies at both the
administrative and agency levels); Symons, The "Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective,
51 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 676 (1983) (tracing the development of bank powers).
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restrictive test: whether the activity is "convenient or useful in connection with
the performance of one of the bank's established activities pursuant to its express
powers under the [NBA]. ' According to the leading exposition of the standard,
a proposed activity found "functionally interchangeable" with a traditional bank
service will be permitted.3" Conversely, an activity that is attractive to the bank
only because of the bank's superior access to capital, or that is found to expose
the bank to risks "more onerous" than traditional banking businesses will be
denied.3 9 Under the NBA, courts have permitted national banks to sell travelers'
checks and foreign currency,'
0 issue letters of credit,"' engage in full-payout
leasing,'42 operate discount brokerages,
43 underwrite and sell credit life insurance,4
and manage and sell collective trust funds for individual retirement 
accounts. 45
Courts, however, have refused to permit national banks to underwrite nongeneral
obligation government bonds, 46 manage or sell collective investment accounts to
be held in a nontrust capacity, 47 operate a travel agency,
4 market travel services
for others,49 offer nonfinancial data processing services,
50 engage in personal
property leasing, 5' or broker real estate loans in urban communities.
5 2
2. State Banks
The powers of state banks and their subsidiaries are determined primarily
by state law. Historically, most states have imposed restrictions on permissible
37. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 432 (1st Cir. 1972). Express powers
include "discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other
evidences of debt; receiving deposits; buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; loaning
money on personal security; and obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes ..... 12 U.S.C. §
24 (1982).
38. M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1383 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
39. Id. Two implicit assumptions of the M & M Leasing Corp. approach-that banks are
inclined toward expansion into nonbanking businesses to exploit cheap capital, and that en-
gagement in businesses more risky than banking is destabilizing to banks-pervade debates over
the separation of banking and commerce. See infra text accompanying notes 189-243 (examining
critically the debates over the separation of banking and commerce).
40. Arnold Tours, Inc., 472 F.2d at 438.
41. Id.
42. M & M Leasing Corp., 563 F.2d at 1383.
43. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252, 260 (D.D.C.
1983), aff'd per curiam, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 790 (1986).
44. Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1170 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980).
45. Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986), reversing 593
F. Supp. 846 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Investment Co. Inst. v. Clarke, 630 F. Supp. 593, 597 (D.C.
Conn.), aff'd per curiam, 789 F.2d 175 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 422 (1986); Investment
Co. Inst. v. Conover, 596 F. Supp. 1496, 1501 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd 790 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied 107 S. Ct. 421 (1986).
46. Baker, Watts, & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F.Supp. 247, 251-52 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub
nom., Port of N.Y. Authority v. Baker, Watts, & Co., 392 F.2d 497, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
47. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 635 (1971).
48. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 438 (1st Cir. 1972).
49. American Soc'y of Travel Agents v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 385 F.
Supp. 1084, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
50. National Retailers Corp. of Ariz. v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 411 F. Supp. 308,
315 (D.C. Ariz. 1976), aff'd, 604 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1977).
51. M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1383 (9th Cir.
1977).
52. Guaranty Mortgage Co. v. Z.I.D. Assocs., 506 F. Supp. 101, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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lines of business for state banks similar to restrictions imposed by federal law
on national banks,53 although a handful of states have granted somewhat broader
powers.5 4 Recently, however, a number of states have liberalized substantially
the powers of state banks." In response, the FDIC has proposed rules that
would prohibit federally insured state banks from engaging directly in certain
businesses, including real estate development and insurance underwriting, and
would place restrictions on bank transactions with affiliates engaged in such
businesses. 56 Federal law prohibits all state banks from directly engaging in the
business of underwriting securities other than general government obligations.57
State banks that have opted to become members of the Federal Reserve System
(state member banks) are subject to the same limitations on ownership of
subsidiaries as imposed by the NBA on national banks.5
B. Restrictions on Investments by Banks
National banks may invest in treasury securities, general obligation gov-
ernment debt instruments, and the debt of certain quasi-governmental issuers.5 9
They generally may not, however, own corporate equity, 60 nor may they invest
voluntarily in real estate, except in premises for bank operations. 61 Investments
in securities by state member banks are subject to the same limits as national
53. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 658.16 (1985) (limiting banks to "general banking or trust
business").
54. See generally Continued Banking Deregulation Seems Inevitable, Legal Times, March
5, 1984, at 14 (tracing the history of non-banking powers of state banks).
55. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 751.37, 772, 1338 (West Supp. 1987) (authorizing state
banks to underwrite mutual funds, engage in real estate development, and invest in corporate
securities); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51-16-41 (Supp. 1987) (allowing state banks to underwrite
and sell insurance). The expansion of state banking powers has emerged as one of a number
of contentious bank-related issues being debated vigorously before Congress. See Federal Law-
makers and Regulators Fear States Are Going Too Far in Expanding Banks' Powers, Wall St.
J., July 31, 1985, at 46, col. 4.
56. 50 Fed. Reg. 23,963 (1985). The FDIC asserts authority to issue the rules pursuant
to its statutory jurisdiction to police bank safety and soundness.
Prompted by the de facto insolvency of the FSLIC insurance fund, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) has imposed regulations on insured thrifts that are considerably
more stringent than those proposed by the FSLIC for commercial banks. Notwithstanding any
powers granted under state law, the regulations limit investments by insured thrifts in equity
securities, real estate, thrift service corporations, and operating subsidiaries to the greater of
10% of assets or twice "regulatory net worth," i.e., net worth computed in accordance with
regulatory accounting principles. Direct investment by thrifts with less than minimum required
capitalization is prohibited without supervisory approval, and direct investment by thrifts with
a regulatory net worth of less than 3% of total liabilities is limited to twice regulatory net
worth. 12 C.F.R. § 563.9-8(c)(2) (1987).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982).
58. Id. § 335.
59. Id. § 24.
60. Id. An exception is made for ownership of the stock of a corporation organized to
conduct the safe-deposit business. Id. Although a national bank may purchase corporate debt,
only issues that have minimal default risk and that are readily marketable are permissible. 12
C.F.R. § 1.5(a) (1987).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982). A national bank also may acquire real property for lease to
a public tenant provided that, pursuant to the lease agreement, the tenant will become owner
of the property at the completion of the lease. 12 C.F.R. § 7.3300 (1987).
[Winter
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banks, 62 however, their real estate powers are determined by state law. Restrictions
on nonmember state banks vary. Most states prohibit ownership of corporate
equity, but many permit investments in real property.63
C. Restrictions on Bank Holding Companies
Bank holding companies and their affiliates generally are restricted by the
BHCA to the business of banking and other businesses determined by the Board
"to be so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to
be a proper incident thereto .... " The BHCA directs the Board "[i]n de-
termining whether a particular activity is a proper incident to banking ... [to]
consider whether its performance by an affiliate of a [bank] holding company
can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public . .. that outweigh
possible adverse effects ... ."6 Judicial constructions have treated these pro-
visions disjunctively with the result that bank holding company affiliates can
engage only in businesses that are "closely related" to banking and that offer
a preponderance of "public benefits.""
The Board permits nonbanking activities by means of regulation or, on
application for permit, by individual order. 67 Among the activities permitted by
regulation are a number of functions historically performed by banks or per-
missible by national banks. These activities include making and servicing loans,
68
performing trust company functions, 69 and engaging in full-payout leasing.
70 In
addition, the Board also has approved by regulation a number of activities not
historically regarded as banking functions. The Board, however, has restricted
them in various ways such that the activities qualify as "closely related" to
banking. For example, the Board permits a bank holding company or its sub-
62. 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1982).
63. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 658.67(7) (1985) (permitting Florida banks to place up to 60%
of their capital accounts into real property investments).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982). In a significant departure from the usual parallelism
of bank and thrift regulation, restrictions on engagement in unrelated businesses by savings and
loan holding companies apply only to holding companies that own two or more thrifts. Id. §
1730a(c)(2). As a result, nonfinancial corporations legally may acquire a thrift subsidiary and
a number of them have done so, including Sears, Roebuck, and Co., National Steel Corp., J.
C. Penney Co., and Parker Pen Co.
65. Id. § 1730a(c)(2).
66. Independent Bankers Ass'n. of Ga. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
516 F.2d 1206, 1215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Considerable grounds exist for skepticism that Congress
intended such a bifurcated test. See Note, The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of
1970, 39 GEo. VA SH. L. Pav. 1200, 1217-23 (1971). Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit, although
apparently acknowledging the possibility that it misconstrued the statutory test, has declined to
revisit the issue on the jurisprudentially dubious principle that it is now well established in case
law, including Supreme Court precedent. Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Bd.
of Governers of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
67. The list of nonbanking activities permitted by regulation is codified in Federal Reserve
Board Regulation Y. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1987). Engagement in these activities de novo only
requires notice to the Board. Id. § 225.23(a). Permission to enter other lines of business or
acquisition of a business engaged in a listed activity requires the affirmative approval of the
Board. Id.
68. Id. § 225.25(b)(1).
69. Id. § 225.25(b)(3).
70. Id. § 225.25(b)(5).
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sidiary to provide courier services, but only for specified kinds of documents
or financial instruments between financial institutions or for business documents
constituting or used in processing "[a]udit and accounting media of a banking
or financial nature . . . ."' Management consulting services are permitted, but
only to specified financial institutions.72 Data processing services are allowed,
but only if the data processed are "financial, banking or, economic" and any
hardware provided in connection with the services is limited in value to not
more than thirty percent of the total cost of the package. 73 The Board also has
permitted a number of activities by order, but has not added them to the list
of activities permitted by regulation. 74 Presumably, these activities qualify as
"closely related" to banking, but the Board is unwilling to permit bank holding
companies to engage in them without case-by-case consideration of "public
benefits" issues.
As applied by the Board, the "public benefits" test has been concerned
primarily with antitrust policies and bank solvency. A bank holding company
proposing to engage in a "closely related" business generally has been denied
permission when the Board has perceived either a likely anticompetitive effect
or the possibility of significant financial risks to the consolidated entity. 75 Less
frequently, the Board has been concerned with the effect of a decision on its
supervisory or monetary policy functions76 and, in a small number of cases, the
threat of "undue concentration of economic resources" for reasons other than
anticompetitive effect.7 Conversely, in the absence of perceived anticompetitive
effect and financial risks, to satisfy the "public benefits" requirement the Board
generally has accepted the applicant's claim of economies of scale, economies
of scope, enhanced customer convenience, or access to new managerial resources. 78
III. THE HISTORICAL PURPOSES OF SEPARATION
What accounts for the adoption of this peculiar pattern of restrictions on
the banking business? The answer is not easy. The hodge-podge of current laws
71. Id. § 225.25(b)(10).
72. Id. § 225.25(b)(11).
73. Id. § 225.25(b)(7).
74. See, e.g., BankAmerica Corporation, Order Approving the Sale and Issuance of
Payment Instruments and Related Activities, 70 Fed. Reserve Bull., No. 4, at 364 (Apr. 1984)
(issuance and sale of variably denominated payment instruments); Citibank, Order Approving
Acquisition of Savings and Loan Association, 70 Fed. Reserve Bull., No. 2, at 157 (Feb. 1984)
(operating a distressed thrift); Orbanco Financial Services Corporation, Order Authorizing Un-
derwriting and Dealing in Certain Government Securities and Money Market Instruments, 69
Fed. Reserve Bull., No. 6, at 465 (June 1983) (issuance of large-denomination money orders);
Midland Bank Ltd., Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Company, Acquisition of
Nonbank and Edge Act Subsidiaries and Retention of Nonbank Companies, Order Denying
Retention of Travel Agency Activities of Thomas Cook, Inc., 67 Fed. Reserve Bull., No. 9, at
729 (Sept. 1981) (dealing in precious metals).
75. See M. JESSE & S. SEELIG, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 63-
76 (1977) (providing an empirical analysis of Board decisions relating to applications to engage
in nonbanking businesses by bank holding companies over a five and one-half year period).
76. For example, the Board has indicated concern that widespread issuance of large-
denomination money orders could make the conduct of monetary policy more problematic.
BankAmerica Corporation, supra note 74, at 365.
77. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
78. M. JESSE & S. SEELIG, supra note 75, at 75.
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developed in three stages: (1) a formative period lasting until sometime after
the Civil War during which the states and federal government adopted chartering
laws generally understood to preclude banks from engaging in commercial bus-
inesses; (2) a brief revisionist epoch in the 1930s during which Congress sub-
stantially reformed financial regulation by enacting in very short order a succession
of major laws that expanded and reinforced the historical separation, addressing
a perceived crisis in capital markets; and (3) an era of regulatory expansion in
the three decades following World War II during which the separation was
extended to encompass bank affiliates. The reasons for the adoption of various
separation-related legislation differ greatly among stages, but none persuasively
explains the doctrine's contemporary force.
A. Charter Restrictions on Bank Powers
The first enactment of restrictions on banks' commercial activities in the
United States has a simple, if uncompelling explanation: it was the result of
the wholesale and uncritical copying of English banking practices. The use of
limited-power bank charters in England dates back to the late 17th century.
79
A limited powers clause was first enacted in the 1694 Parliamentary revisions
to the proposed royal charter of the Bank of England.
80 The amendment man-
ifested longstanding antagonisms between Parliament and the Crown, rather than
any principle or policy regarding the organization of financial markets: Parliament
simply was minimizing the charter powers of the bank to limit the value of the
royal franchise and to protect the interests of its constituency of small merchants.
Colonial America imported restrictions on commercial activities of banks
along with many of the other paraphernalia of English monetary and banking
law. The states and federal government uncritically received the English model
of a central bank with private ownership, a monopoly franchise, and quasi-
public monetary functions, often using language copied from the Charter of the
Bank of England to implement the choice.
8' The proscription on trading activities
imposed by Parliament on the Bank of England was incorporated substantially
verbatim in the charter of the Bank of New York in 1784, the Pennsylvania
recharter of the Bank of North America in 1787, and the federal charter of
the First Bank of the United States in 1791.82
The ready acceptance of the practice of granting only limited banking charters
in the United States is better ascribed to simple inertia than replication of relevant
English circumstances. Eighteenth century America was primarily an agrarian
79. See Salley, supra note 1, at 196-208 (presenting a sketch of earlier experiences with
the separation in continental Europe).
80. Shull, supra note 4, at 259-65. The amendment provided:
And to the intent that their Majesties subjects may not be oppressed by the said
corporation by their monopolizing or engrossing any sort of goods, wares, or
merchansise be it further declared . . . that the said corporation . . . shall not at
any time . . . deal or trade . . . in the buying or selling of any goods, wares or
merchandise whatsoever ....
Id. at 260 (quoting 5 & 6 William & Mary c. 26).
81. See B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CrVIL WAR 63-129 (1957).
82. Id.
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society and its debates over banking policies reflected more concerns over the
availability of agricultural credit and fears of centralized government than the
political and class antagonisms that led to the separation in England.83 It may
be reasonably inferred, therefore, that the adoption of particular language from
the charter of the Bank of England owed less to a conscious policy of protecting
small commercial businesses than to a general tendency to accept wholesale
British norms of sound banking and commercial practice, at least where no
substantial interest opposed them.s4 Similarly, the inclusion of limited powers
language in the NBA was due more to its draftsmen's reliance on state precedents
than any conscious intention to restrict commercial banking practices. 5
The casualness with which bank charter restrictions were adopted was mir-
rored by the casualness with which they were observed. Banks regarded the law
as a formality and evaded its restrictions on their powers by conducting ultra
vires businesses through state-chartered corporate affiliates.8 6 By the early twen-
tieth century, banks had expanded their businesses well beyond traditional limits
to include broad investment banking powers including underwriting and dealing
in investment securities.Y Congress abetted this development by conferring trust
powers on national banks in 191388 and by permitting direct dealings in debt
securities in 1927.89
B. Glass-Steagall and the Divorce of Commercial
and Investment Banking
1. The Enactment of Glass-Steagall
In contrast to charter restrictions, prohibitions on engagement by commercial
banks in investment banking were not adopted fortuitously and have not been
83. These issues largely framed the debate over the first Bank of the United States. See
P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 60-61 (2d ed. 1963)
(discussing the Hamiltonian view in favor of a National bank and the opposing views of the
Jeffersonians).
84. There were, of course, alternative models that could have been adopted. Businesses
that integrated banking and commercial functions frequently existed in continental Europe and
were not unknown in eighteenth century America. See B. HAMMOND, supra note 81, at 154-
55. Nevertheless, reliance on English banking traditions pervaded early American experience.
The adoption of the entire panoply of English banking practices without significant revision,
including practices emanating from particularities of English life and history, exemplifies a
common practice of legal systems in periods of abrupt political or technological transition. Not
infrequently, societies undergoing such transitions copy whole bodies of law from extrinsic
sources, with fortuities of language or education strongly influencing the choice of sources. See
generally A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 29-30 (1974) (describing the phenomenon of borrowed
law).
85. Symons, supra note 36, at 698-701. Indeed, Symons contended that Congress intended
to induce state banks to convert to federal charter by adopting the broadest powers formulation
then existing under statute, the New York Free Banking Act of 1838. Id. at 689-98.
86. See V. CaRosso, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA 98 (1970) (describing the affiliate
system).
87. F. REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING 392-93 (2d ed. 1968).
88. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 11, 38 Stat. 251, 261-63 (1914) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 248 (1982)).
89. McFadden Act of 1927, ch. 191, §2, 44 Stat. 1224, 1226 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 24 (1982)). The power to deal in debt securities already had been recognized by the
Comptroller in a series of opinions stretching back into the nineteenth century. See F. REDLICH,
supra note 87, at 392-93.
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observed casually. Rather, their enactment was the result of a conscious attempt
to grapple with an endemic problem of the United States banking industry: its
tendency to incur episodes of bank panic and regional banking collapse. The
immediate impetus for the legislation was the series of panics that followed the
stock market collapse of 1929.90 The crisis spurred a congressional inquiry,
chaired by Senator Carter Glass of New York, that attributed blame for the
market collapse to the bank affiliate system and popularized the notion that
bank "conflicts of interests" were chiefly responsible for the recurrent bouts
of banking panic. 91 Confirmation of this belief was found readily in the cir-
cumstances of the 1930 collapse of the unfortunately named Bank of the United
States. The failure of the bank, a major private institution with over $200
million dollars in deposits, was the signal event of the first banking crisis of
the Great Depression. The bank's demise was widely ascribed to abuses in
transactions with its securities affiliates.92 Responding to the perception, Glass
engineered the inclusion of a plank favoring the divorce of commercial and
investment banking in the 1932 Democratic Party platform and campaigned on
behalf of the party ticket with perorations against "insatiable" banks and "their
lawless affiliates." 93 Upon the installation of a new President and Congress in
1933, Glass' proposal was joined with a bill offered by Representative Henry
Steagall to create a federal deposit insurance system. The resulting compromise
legislation was cleared quickly by both Houses in June 1933 and signed by
President Roosevelt shortly thereafter.94
The term "conflicts of interests" has a somewhat unconventional meaning
when used to describe the purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act (Glass-Steagall).
In its ordinary usage, the term refers to situations where there exists an op-
portunity for self-dealing at the expense of bank clients, beneficiaries of its trust
accounts, or bank creditors. "Conflicts of interests" in this sense are endemic
in banking. For example, a bank generally may loan funds to a trust for which
it is trustee; 95 it may serve as the trustee for debt securities of an issuer of
which it is a creditor;9 and it may make loans to officers, directors, and affiliated
persons. 97 Although some attention is directed at such situations in the federal
90. See M. FRIEDMAN & A. ScHWARTz, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES,
1867-1960, at 299-419 (5th ed. 1971) (discussing the economic and banking history from 1929-
1933).
91. Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 71 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 40 (1931) [hereinafter 1931 Senate Hearings]. The hearings
are recounted briefly in Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629-34 (1971).
92. 1931 Senate Hearings, supra note 91, at 116-17, 1017, 1068; see also Perkins, The
Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483, 496-97 (1971)
(attributing press criticism of the affiliate system to the collapse of the Bank of the United
States).
93. Perkins, supra note 92, at 518-19.
94. Id. at 524.
95. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 660.38(2) (1985) (empowering Florida banks to lend funds to
trust accounts); 12 C.F.R. § 9.12(0 (1987) (permitting national banks to lend funds to a bank
trust account where not prohibited by local law).
96. Under federal law, a bank is disqualified as a bond trustee only under specified
circumstances, including the ownership of non-voting securities of the issuer. See Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, ch. 411, § 310(b), 53 Stat. 1149 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b) (1982)).
97. See 12 C.F.R. § 31 (1987) (setting forth regulations regarding loans to insiders of
national banks); id. § 215 (same regarding Federal Reserve member banks); id. § 337.3 (same
regarding state non-member banks).
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statutes, 9 and scattered references in the legislative history of Glass-Steagall
indicate they were a concern of the 1933 Congress," Glass-Steagall did not
address the broad range of such "conflicts." In practice, control of such abuses,
except in connection with distribution of and dealing in securities, was left to
the general supervisory powers of regulators, private litigation, and market forces.
Rather, in the context of Glass-Steagall, the rubric "conflicts of interest" has
been used to allude to a number of inducements inherent in an integrated
commercial and investment banking firm to undertake behavior that jeopardizes
the solvency of the bank, either by encouraging the bank to misdirect its assets
into the securities markets, or by causing a loss of depositor confidence in the
bank. This usage encompasses both the "obvious danger" that a bank might
be tempted to invest imprudently in its securities affiliates or the customers of
its affiliates, and more "subtle hazards" emanating from the bank's interest in
maintaining its own reputation of the bank and the economic vitality of related
businesses.100
2. "Conflicts of Interests" as a Continuing Justification
for Limitations on Bank Activities
Whatever the immediate cause of the banking calamities of the early 1930s,
"conflicts of interests" hardly were the core problem of United States banking.
The divorce of commercial and investment banking alone would not have ame-
liorated significantly the problem of banking instability. The root cause of episodic
banking panics lay in the inherently unstable nature of fractional reserve
intermediation, rather than in abusive banking practices. Given the stock market
crash of 1929 and the ensuing decline in economic activity, the failure of the
Federal Reserve System to accommodate an increased demand for cash balances
probably was the decisive factor in causing the banking crises of the early 1930s.
Earlier panics had been triggered by other causes not addressed by Glass-
Steagall.101
98. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 375, 375a, 376, 503 (1982) (regulating transactions
between member banks, their officers, directors, and affiliates).
99. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 633 (1971).
100. In Camp, the Supreme Court identified a number of "subtle hazards" that Glass-
Steagall sought to remedy: (1) the temptation to a.bank to divert resources to support a failing
affiliate in order to protect the reputation of the bank; (2) the potential for loss of client
goodwill during periods of securities market deflation because of the decline in value of securities
previously underwritten by the bank affiliate; (3) the adverse incentive to a bank to undertake
imprudent loans in order to finance purchases of securities by the borrower; and (4) the temptation
to a bank to unload securities into its trust accounts in violation of its fiduciary responsibilities.
Id. at 629-34.
101. The relationship of the supply of high-powered money, deposit inconvertibility, and
bank runs was understood by academicians and banking experts before 1930, but not, apparently,
by Federal Reserve System officials. Although the Board devoted substantial attention to the
problems of the banking system following October 1930, it was preoccupied with the quality
of bank management, and devoted little attention to the adequacy of bank liquidity. See M.
FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 90, at 299-419. Board officials "tended to regard bank
failures as regrettable consequences of bad management and bad banking practices, or as inevitable
reactions to prior speculative excesses, or as a consequence but hardly a cause of the financial
and economic collapse in process." Id. at 358; see also Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Agenda
for Reform 31 (1983) (attributing the banking crisis to the failure of the Federal Reserve Board
to exercise its discretion properly).
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Because, in a fractional reserve system, the claims of depositors ordinarily
exceed by many times the cash immediately available to a bank in the absence
of external assistance a bank will be able to honor demands for withdrawal of
funds as long as new deposits roughly equal or exceed withdrawals. Therefore,
whenever the situation appears likely that withdrawals substantially will exceed
new deposits in a particular institution, its depositors have a rational incentive
to withdraw quickly their own funds before the institution's liquidity is exhausted.
Moreover, since the assets of one bank are the liabilities of another, efforts by
a bank to augment its cash on hand by liquidating assets are likely to have the
effect of spreading illiquidity and inducing depositor runs on other institutions.'°2
While a perception of imminent illiquidity sufficient to trigger a bank run could
result from bank securities transactions, it also could result from changes in
the economy of the locality in which a bank operates, the vicissitudes of its
credit customers, or the imprudence or bad luck of bank management.
While the Glass-Steagall restrictions on investment banking powers may have
reduced marginally the incidence of bank failure, they generally did not resolve
the instability of fractional reserve banking. In fact, the end of banking instability
in the United States was wrought by the other consequential provision of Glass-
Steagall federal deposit insurance. Academic economists never joined in the
popular misconception of the relationship between "conflicts of interests" and
deposit instability. From its inception, economists regarded the separation of
commercial and investment banking as a very subsidiary element of a bill whose
centerpiece was deposit insurance. 03 Deposit insurance resolved the instability
of banking by assuring depositors of the safety and accessibility of their deposits,
thereby obviating the necessity of maintaining vigilant attention to bank solvency.
By averting depositors' impulse to withdraw funds in anticipation of withdrawal
imbalances, deposit insurance ended the potential for bank panics and brought
stability to fractional reserve banking.104 By the same token, deposit insurance
102. Banking failures are likely to be correlated in a fractional reserve system for another
reason: the total of demand deposits vastly exceeds the total cash, MN, available in the economy.
Any precipitant increase in the desirability of holding cash balances relative to bank deposits
that is not accompanied by rapid increases in M. necessarily leads to the failure of banking
intermediaries. See T. MAYER, J. DUSENBERRY & R. ALIBER, MONEY, BANKING AND THE ECONOMY
178-90 (1984) (providing an elementary development of the money multiplier associated with
fractional reserve banking); see also Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the
President 146-47 (Feb. 1984) [hereinafter 1984 CEA Report] (analyzing the disequilibrium nature
of fractional reserve banking).
103. See, e.g., Preston, The Banking Act of 1933, 23 AM. ECON. REv. 585, 597 (1933).
Preston exhibited the skepticism, widespread among economists in the 1930s, that deposit insurance
could succeed. Id. at 597-600. Preston was the first to identify in print the problem of insurance-
induced risk-taking, a concern that has emerged fifty years later as a central issue of banking
regulation. See infra text accompanying notes 169-177.
104. During the years 1921 to 1929, an era of generally uninterrupted prosperity, an average
of 600 banks per year failed, and from the stock market crash in 1929 to the end of 1933,
approximately 9,000 banks closed. In contrast, during the eight years between the initiation of
federal deposit insurance and the onset of World War II, only about 400 banks failed, and in
the thirty years between 1942 and 1972, only 110 banks failed. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Deposit Insurance in a Changing Environment 1-3 to 1-6 (1983). Although the
number of bank failures has risen in the last few years and risen dramatically in the past two
years, only 138 banks failed in 1986. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1986 Annual
Report, Table 122, at 53 [hereinafter FDIC 1986 Annual Report]. Total FDIC losses and expenses
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also rendered superfluous concerns relating to the "subtle hazards" of conflicts
of interests because they were premised upon the necessity of maintaining the
confidence of depositors. Under existing deposit insurance practices, depositors
have no rational reason for sensitivity to the reputation of the depository or
its affiliates. 05 This fact gives the Glass-Steagall jurisprudence a cabalistic air
as courts have struggled to define the scope of the Act's prohibitions according
to mechanical tests for the presence of "conflicts of interests" and "subtle
hazards," although these tests serve no policy purpose.'
°0
C. The Adoption of the Bank Holding Company Act and
the Attack on "Undue Concentration" in Banking
1. The Enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act
The success of federal deposit insurance in stabilizing banking did not end
the call for further federal regulation of banking. Proposals for bank holding
on account of failed banks were only about $2.8 billion, or about .12% of total deposits of
insured banks. Id. Tables 127 & 128, at 63-64. Friedman and Schwartz called federal deposit
insurance "the most important structural change in the banking system to result from the 1933
panic and, indeed in our view, the structural change most conducive to monetary stability since
state bank note issues were taxed out of existence immediately after the Civil War." M. FRIEDMAN
& A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 90, at 434.
105. Even for depositors with amounts in excess of the insurance ceiling, there is little
cause for concern. In practice, insolvency reorganizations of institutions with significant uninsured
deposits take place by the "purchase and assumption" transaction. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)
(setting forth the "purchase and assumption" transaction for banks); id. § 1729(0 (same regarding
thrifts). In such a transaction, the FDIC or FSLIC, as receiver, transfers the liabilities and good
assets of the failed depository to another bank or thrift, and pays the assuming party the
difference less the value of goodwill. If the transferee assumes any unsecured obligations of the
failed bank, all the creditors of the failed institution, except holders of subordinated debt, must
be paid in full. First Empire Bank of N.Y. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 572 F.2d 1361, 1369-
71 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919. This practice has meant that unsubordinated
creditors of larger institutions effectively are insured fully without regard to the $100,000 per
account ceiling. The liquidation of the Penn Square National Bank in 1982 was the only instance
in FDIC history in which unsubordinated creditors of a bank with assets of more than $100
million dollars sustained any loss. Short, FDIC Settlement Practices and the size of Failed Banks,
Fed. Reserve Bank of Dallas Econ. Rev., Mar. 1985, at 12. Subsequent to the Penn Square
experience, regulators have resumed a policy of paying all depositors of large banks in full.
When Continental Illinois National Bank was threatened with collapse in 1984, regulators publicly
waived insurance limits to prevent an outflow of uninsured funds. Silverberg, Resolving Large
Bank Problems and Failures, Iss. Bank Reg., Winter 1985, at 12, 13.
106. In Securities Ind. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d 1052
(D.C. Cir. 1986), Judge Bork, writing for the court, grudgingly acquiesced in the jurisprudential
requirement by invoking the "subtle hazard" analysis, but interpreted it so as not to affect his
determination that member bank affiliates may engage in the private placement of commercial
paper. Although Bork conceded that such activity presented at least one "subtle hazard," he
concluded that it was not barred under Glass-Steagall because all the "subtle hazards" identified
by the Supreme Court were not present. Id. at 1066-70.
Although courts have applied the teachings of Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617
(1971) to Glass-Steagall cases, its precepts have not necessarily been applied in other contexts.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit refused to permit the FHLBB to issue a cease and desist order where
the only nexus between the conduct it sought to enjoin and "safety and soundness" was depositor
perceptions of the thrift's reputation. The Court recognized that "loss of public confidence"
did not threaten the solvency of the thrift. Gulf Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n of Jefferson Parish
v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 264-265 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1121 (1982).
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company legislation that included restrictions on engaging in nonbanking bus-
inesses were introduced in virtually every Congress from the 1930s onward.
0 7
The Board, with equal regularity, had endorsed such proposals on the spurious
grounds that legislation was necessary to close "gaps" in the separation of
banking and nonbanking businesses' °s reasoning that "[tihe fact that Congress
has required banks to stay out of nonbanking business but to stay solely in the
banking business ... should carry over into the holding company field."'19
The Board's position contravened both history and logic. Congress never
had affirmatively required banks to stay out of nonbanking business; the NBA
copied, without substantive change, the powers clause from the New York Free
Banking Act of 1838, the most liberal contemporaneous state banking statute,
thereby giving national banks the broadest powers allowed state banks under
state laws." 0 Indeed, the powers clause, to the extent it was given any attention
by Congress, "was considered of little significance.""' Rather, subsequent in-
terpretations of the statute by comptrollers of the currency and various courts
p5rovided its restrictive cast." 2 The Board's position also ignored the obvious
difference for the potential solvency of the bank between the engagement in
nonbanking businesses by a bank or its subsidiaries and by a holding company
or its nonbanking subsidiaries. The former necessarily ties the solvency of the
bank to the performance of nonbanking businesses; the latter does not.",
The ultimate success of proponents of further bank regulation owed little
to the force of the Board's arguments. The voluminous hearings that preceded
passage of the BHCA focused only infrequently on its nonbanking provisions.
The few empirical data provided by the Board in Senate hearings appear to
contradict the necessity of extending the separation of banking and commerce
to holding companies. Of eighteen bank holding companies for which evidence
was presented by the Board, five owned no nonbanking subsidiaries and ap-
parently only one, Transamerica Corporation, was engaged substantially in non-
107. Note, The Demise of the Bank/Nonbank Distinction: An Argument for Deregulating
the Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 98 HARV. L. REV. 650, 656 (1985).
108. Bank Holding Legislation: Hearings on S. 76 and S. 1118 Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1953) (testimony of J.L. Robertson, member
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
109. Control of Bank Holding* Companies: Hearings on S. 880, S. 2350, and H.R. 6227
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
65 (1955) (hereinafter 1955 Senate Hearings] (testimony of J.L. Robertson, member of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
110. See Symons, supra note 36, at 699.
111. Id.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 30-52.
113. The degree to which the holding company structure insulates banks from the vicissitudes
of its nonbanking affiliates is the subject of some controversy. Compare Case & Mingo, The
Regulation of Bank Holding Companies, 30 J. FiN. 281 (1971) (arguing that the holding company
structure reduces bank risk, since bank income does not depend on affiliate performance and
the bank is not legally liable for affiliate's debts) with Eisenbeis, How Should Bank Holding
Companies be Regulated?, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev., Jan. 1983, at 42 (arguing
that the insolvencies of affiliates will bring pressure to convert bank assets). The truth, as in
most cases, likely lies somewhere between the polar contentions. Whatever the truth, this Article
largely ignores the controversy in favor of a broader framing of issues: whether there ought to
be a separation and, if so, how it should be defined.
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banking businesses."14 Of the approximately $654 million of book value holdings
in Transmerica's nonbanking companies, $504 million was accounted for by a
family of insurance companies and only $35 million was in two operating
nonfinancial companies, a metals manufacturer and a fish processing company."'
Nor was the Board able to identify any actual problem of "conflicts of interests"
arising from bank holding company involvement in nonbanking businesses."
6
What prompted the revival of holding company legislation, dormant for so
many years? In a phrase, congressional passage of the BHCA in 1956 was due
to "fear of size.1" 7 The late 1940s and early 1950s saw two "boomlets" of
merger activity across a broad spectrum of American industry," 8 including
banking." 9 Public perception of increased economic concentration had earlier
spurred the 1950 enactment of the Cellar-Kefauver Act,
20 which amended the
Clayton Act to restrain more vigorously horizontal and vertical industrial mergers.'
2 '
114. 1955 Senate Hearings, supra note 109, at 63-64.
115. Id. at 63.
116. Questioned whether there was a danger that loans would be extended to bank affiliates
improvidently, Governor Robertson responded:
I would say that, insofar as the 18 companies which are regulated at the moment
are concerned, I cannot think of a single violation of section 23(a) of the Federal
Reserve Act which regulates the amount of loans which a bank can make to the
holding company and its subsidiaries. They are limited and restricted, and all must
be amply secured.
Id. at 64. Pressed by Senator Douglas of Illinois to identify the harm of affiliations between
banks and other business, Governor Robertson suggested the possibility that persons seeking
credit would be influenced to patronize bank affiliates, leading to the following colloquy:
Senator Douglas: "Is it merely a potential danger or do you think it is an actual
practice?"
Mr. Robertson: "I hesitate to make statements I cannot prove. Therefore, I could
not state an instance which I would be willing to vouch for."
Senator Douglas: "Do you think Congress should legislate on suspicion?"
Mr. Robertson: "I think Congress should take into consideration the potentialities
involved and the fact that you have to have an entirely different sort of attitude
in dealing with depositors' funds than your own. The fact that Congress has required
banks to stay out of nonbanking business but to stay solely in the banking business,
I think, should carry over into the holding company field. If there is no real danger
at the moment, you are not hurting anybody by such legislation."
Id. at 65 (emphasis supplied).
117. Note, The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 9 SrAN. L. REv. 333, 346 (1957).
118. See G. BENSTON, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 5-7 (1980) (presenting in graphical form
the volume of mergers between 1895 and 1980).
119. See Alhadeff & Alhadeff, Recent Bank Mergers, 69 Q. J. EcoN. 503 (1955) (presenting
data indicative of significant post war bank merger activity).
120. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1982)).
121. As originally drafted, § 7 of the Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 38 Stat. 731-32
(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)), the principal statutory weapon against
anticompetitive mergers, applied only to transactions effected by stock acquisition and, hence,
was circumvented easily by structuring mergers as assets acquisitions. As a result, the statute
virtually was a "dead letter." Comment, "Substantially to Lessen Competition . . . " Current
Problems of Horizontal Mergers, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1629-30 (1959). Between the original
enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914 and the mid-1940s, a period during which thousands of
mergers took place, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice together
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The Cellar-Kefauver Act, however, generally was regarded as inapplicable to
banks and bank holding companies, and bank regulators continued to rely on
the largely impotent provisions of earlier legislation to prevent anticompetitive
mergers.' 2  Public unhappiness with the apparent inability of existing antitrust
law to control banking aggregation crystallized with the Board's well-publicized
failure in 1953 to dismantle the Transamerica banking empire. 23 The Transamerica
Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Systemlu decision spurred
Congress to action and resurrected the dormant eighteen-year old bank holding
company regulation proposal.
Given the circumstances, congressional attention was directed primarily at
the provisions of the proposed legislation that regulated bank acquisitions lest
unrestrained growth of bank holding companies result, in the words of its
framers, in "undue concentration of control of banking activities."' 1 Although
brought only a total of 82 actions under § 7, and they succeeded in establishing violations in
only 12 cases. S. Ax!NN, B. FOGG & N. STOLL, ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-ScoTT-RODINO
ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT 21 (1984). The Cellar-Kefauver Act added an asset acquisition
provision to § 7. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). Subsequently, the stock and assets provisions together
were held to reach, by implication, merger transactions not falling precisely into either category.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 341-342 (1963).
122. The applicability of the original § 7 of the Clayton Act to banks was doubted widely
in view of statutory language limiting its reach to corporations "engaged in commerce." Pub.
L. No. 81-899, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)). These doubts
apparently were eased during congressional deliberations over the BHCA by the decision of the
Third Circuit in Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 206 F.2d
163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 907 (1953), holding that "commerce" included banking.
Id. at 165. Nonetheless, Transamerica Corp. applied only to stock acquisition mergers. Although
the Cellar-Kefauver Act had amended § 7 to address asset acquisition transactions, the relevant
language was directed only at persons "subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission," 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982), a category not including banks. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)
(1982) (excluding banks from FTC jurisdiction). Not until 1963, with the advent of the Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank Supreme Court decision, was the Clayton Act applied definitely to bank mergers
not effected by stock acquisitions. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 343. In the meantime,
the BHCA functioned as the primary bank antitrust statute with respect to bank mergers and
acquisitions under the authority of § 3(c)(5) of the Act, which required the Board to consider,
inter alia, "whether or not the effect of such acquisition or merger or consolidation would be
to expand the size or extent of the bank holding company system involved beyond limits consistent
with ... the preservation of competition in the field of banking." Bank Holding Company
Act, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 3, 70 Stat. 134 (1956). Subsequent to Philadelphia National Bank,
§ 3(c) was amended to incorporate language borrowed from §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act
and § 7 of the Clayton Act, subject to the proviso that competitive concerns be weighed against
"the public interest ... in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served."
Bank Holding Company Act, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 7(c), 80 Stat. 237 (1966) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982)). The 1966 amendments subsequently have been interpreted
to incorporate established antitrust jurisprudence under the Clayton and Sherman Acts in the
administrative review of proposed bank mergers. Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 638 F.2d 1255, 1261 (5th Cir. 1981).
123. Transamerica Corporation, the successor to the banking empire of A.P. Giannini,
controlled 41% of commercial banking offices, 39% of commercial bank deposits, and 50% of
the commercial loans in the five states of California, Oregon, Nevada, Washington, and Arizona.
Transamerica Corp., 206 F.2d at 167. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit held that the Board had
failed to establish "that the five states constitute a single area of effective competition among
commercial banks" or that Transamerica had "moved measurably toward monopoly power" in
any appropriately defined commercial banking market. Id. at 169.
124. Id.
125. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 2482.
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an issue promoted by the Board and a nominal element of the statute, concern
regarding "conflicts of interests" posed by ownership of nonbanking assets by
bank holding companies played only a minimal role in the passage of the
BHCA. 26 Use of the phrase "undue concentration" in legislative reports ac-
companying the Act blurted two related but quite different policy goals that
continue to underlie contemporary political debate regarding the separation.1
27
One is the promotion of conventional antitrust objectives: the enhancement of
competition in banking markets and allocative efficiency in capital intermedi-
ation. 2 The other, the discouragement of large banking entities, has nothing
to do with competitive efficiency, but rather manifests an ideological antagonism
toward massive aggregation of capital irrespective of the competitive structure
of the market in which it occurs. 129 Although these goals share a common rubric,
they differ conceptually and sometimes are antagonistic. 30
2. Conventional Antitrust Concerns
The conventional antitrust argument for the separation of banking and
commerce is directed against the proliferation of monopoly from banking into
nonbanking businesses. The argument usually proceeds from the following prem-
ises: (1) some banks have monopoly power-that is, the power to obtain su-
pernormal profits by increasing prices above competitive levels by paying less
than competitive rates on deposits or charging more than competitive rates on
loans; (2) banks with monopoly power will tend to expand into nonbanking
businesses to increase the yield from their monopoly power; and (3) conventional
antitrust restraints are inadequate to prevent the spread of such monopolistic
abuses.' 3 1 Local banking markets in fact are highly concentrated,3 2 in part because
126. The Senate Report devoted two sentences to a discussion of the conflict of interest
issue:
The committee was informed of the danger to a bank within a bank holding company
controlling nonbanking assets, should the company unduly favor its nonbanking
operations by requiring the bank's customers to make use of such nonbanking
enterprises as a condition to doing business with the bank. The bill's divestment
provisions should prevent this fear from becoming a reality.
Id. at 2486. This formulation of congressional purposes is notable in two respects: (1) it finessed
Senator Douglas's concern regarding the lack of any evidence of abuse, see supra note 116, by
characterizing the purpose of the provision as prophylactic; and (2) it confused two separate
arguments in favor of the provision, protection of banks and protection of nonbanking competitors
of bank holding companies. See infra text accompanying notes 166-167.
127. See Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1133, 1270-71 (1981).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. For example, restrictions on branch banking diffuse capital by limiting the growth
of individual banks, but they also increase concentration in local banking markets by preventing
the entry of existing banks into new markets. See 1984 CEA Report, supra note 102, at 158.
131. There is no indication that Congress was concerned by another logical possibility:
that a non-banking monopolist would integrate backward into the banking business in order to
circumvent restrictions on price discrimination, by tying the purchase of the product to loans
from the bank at discriminatory rates. Presumably, this conduct would violate the Sherman Act
under conventional antitrust principles.
132. See Heggestad & Mingo, The Competitive Condition of U.S. Banking Markets and
the Impact of Structural Reform, 32 J. FIN. 649, 655-57 (1977) (presenting summary data
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of restrictive government chartering policies and limitations on branch banking. 33
The other premises of the conventional antitrust justification are less convincing.
Why should a bank that has some degree of market power wish to integrate
into a nonbanking business? Casual analysis may suggest two motives with
potentially adverse consequences for social welfare: 34 to extract monopoly profits
from nonbanking customers and to enhance the bank's ability to engage in price
discrimination and thereby appropriate the consumer surplus of its banking
customers.' 35 In practice, conglomerate integration would be unlikely to serve
either goal. A bank rarely would be able to extend market power from deposit
taking and retail banking into nonbanking lines of business, even if the bank
refused to lend to competitors of its nonbanking affiliates. Markets for business
loans simply are too competitive. Some competitors of the nonbanking business
would be financed by other local banks, especially if other banks were not
following restrictive lending policies in order to promote monopolies; others
would find alternative nonbank sources of capital; and still others could be
expected to obtain bank loans from banks outside the locality. 36 The bank's
promoting of its nonbanking businesses by granting credit on favorable terms
reflecting computation of Herfindahl Indexes for each of 248 Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area (SMSAs) and 2470 non-SMSA counties based on 1972 deposits); Rhoades, Concentration
in Local and National Markets, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev., Mar. 1985, at 28
(indicating the stability of high Herfindahl Indexes for SMSAs over time).
133. The pattern of legal restrictions on branching by state and national banks is complex.
The great majority of states place some restrictions on branching, depending on the type of
depository institution, location, mode of branching (by acquisition of an existing bank, by
automated teller machine, etc.), and other factors. As of June, 1985, 8 states prevented branching
in almost all circumstances, 19 states substantially limited branching, and 23 states substantially
permitted state-wide banking. See I Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 3106 (Sept. 12, 1986)
(providing a summary of state branch banking laws); see also Ginsburg, supra note 127, at
1152-55 (analyzing branching restrictions). Under the McFadden Amendment to the NBA, the
Comptroller is empowered to permit national banks to branch only where state banks would
be permitted to branch under state law. 12 U.S.C. § 36(b)(1) (1982).
134. Of course, a bank may have other motives for expansion into nonbanking businesses
which clearly are unobjectionable from an antitrust standpoint, such as exploitation of economies
of scale, reduction of nonsystemic business risk by diversification, or reduction of customer
transaction costs. See infra notes 218-231 and accompanying text. Vertical expansion to effect
price discrimination is assumed to be undesirable for the purpose of constructing this argument,
although the economic welfare effects of price discrimination by a monopolist generally are
ambiguous. See generally Schmalensee, Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-
Degree Price Discrimination, 71 Am. EcoN. REV. 242 (Mar. 1981) (proving that price discrim-
ination can lead to an increase in economic welfare if it makes profitable sales to markets which
could not be served under single price monopoly).
135. A monopolist may integrate forward into businesses involving low-value uses of its
product in order to avoid the dilemma of choosing between setting a low price, to market to
low value users, and a high price, to maximize the extraction of surplus from high-value users.
Thus, a plastics manufacturer may integrate forward into pipe manufacturing, a low-value use,
so that a high market price can be maintained for prosthetics, a high-value use, while still
enjoying the benefits of selling to the pipe market.
136. Restrictions on branch banking do not prevent banks from making loans in areas
where they are not represented by branches and, in practice, many banks actively solicit such
business. As of 1983, 44 banking entities had 202 loan production offices in foreign states.
Whitehead, Interstate Banking: Taking Inventory, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev.,
May 1983, at 18.
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to bank affiliates and their customers would not make sense either.
3 7 Every
dollar of loan subsidy given an affiliate or its customers would reduce bank
income by one dollar. It is no cheaper for a bank to subsidize credit than it
is any nonbanking competitor. Assuming the presubsidy market prices in the
nonbanking business were at a competitive equilibrium, credit subsidies to the
customers of its affiliates could only lose money for the bank.
38
Furthermore, it is improbable that a bank could improve its ability to price-
discriminate among its customers by integrating vertically. A nonbanking firm
with some degree of monopoly power may be able to increase its profits by
acquiring ownership of its customers, because such forward integration could
facilitate price discrimination where it otherwise would be illegal or impractical.
Alternatively, such integration could permit the monopolist to distinguish the
intensities of demand for its product among its various customers and thereby
to exploit more effectively the power to price-discriminate.
3 9 Unlike industrial
companies which effectively are precluded from price-discriminating directly among
customers under existing antitrust laws, however, banks are free to charge
different customers different interest rates on loans without resort to vertical
integration. ' In addition, it is difficult to identify a plausible scenario in which
engagement in nonbanking businesses would provide additional information to
a bank that would be useful in identifying customers' demand schedules for
borrowed funds.
137. The specter of cross-subsidization of nonbanking businesses by provision of easy credit
to customers of the nonbanking business was raised repeatedly in congressional hearings on
proposed bank holding company legislation, often by representatives of the Board. See, e.g.,
1955 Senate Hearings, supra note 109, at 64 (testimony of J.L. Robertson, member of the
Federal Reserve Board). The principal concern was loans to customers of affiliates, since direct
loans to affiliates had been regulated since the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89 § 23A, 48 Stat.
183 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1982)).
138. The only time that credit subsidies to customers of the affiliate would increase profits
of the aggregate business would be when the affiliate was pricing above the competitive market
equilibrium. In such a case, the effect of the credit subsidy would be to lower prices and to
improve allocational efficiency by moving the market towards the competitive equilibrium.
139. See supra note 134. The practices enjoined in International Business Machs. Corp.
v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) illustrate the use of vertical restraints to enhance a
monopolist's power to price discriminate by distinguishing different demand intensities among
its customers. Defendant IBM, one of two manufacturers of automated punch card tabulating
equipment, routinely required lessees of such equipment to use only IBM-supplied punch cards.
Id. at 133-34. The cards apparently were priced by IBM at a substantial premium. Id. at 136.
By requiring the lessees of its machines to use only its cards, IBM was effectively able both
to price discriminate and to do so in such a manner that the highest value customers (i.e., those
that made the greatest use of the tabulating machines) were charged the highest price. Id. at
135-36.
140. Under § 2 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982), as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act of 1936, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1982), it is illegal "to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ...... 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1982). Even in the absence of the Robinson-Patman restrictions, price discrimination
would be impossible, unless the monopolist were able to prevent low-price customers from
reselling to high-price customers. However, such restraints on resales may be illegal or impractical
to enforce. Bank credit extended to different borrowers never has been regarded as a "commodity
of like grade and quality" subject to Robinson-Patman, because the risk characteristics of each
borrower are unique and banks are free to prevent resale of their "product" (capital) by imposing
terms in the loan agreement inhibiting investment by the borrower in other enterprises. Such
agreements are enforced easily because substantial relending would be uncovered in audits made
available to the bank-lender.
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It may be argued that banks would engage in predatory pricing, cross-
subsidizing operations of the nonbanking affiliate even at the cost of sustaining
losses, for the purpose of driving competitors out of business and thereby
establishing a monopoly. The efficacy of predatory pricing as an anticompetitive
strategy is very much in dispute.'
4' At a minimum, predatory pricing can work
only with industries in which there are significant barriers to entry. Otherwise,
the threat of potential entry would inhibit exploitation of the monopoly created
by predation. 42 Regardless of its efficacy, banks have no more incentive to
undertake predatory pricing than any other owner of a nonbanking business of
comparable wealth. Indeed, they may have considerably less incentive, because
the low effective marginal tax rate on banks reduces the value of the tax offset
to the expenses of subsidization and, therefore, makes the after-tax cost of
predatory pricing more expensive for banks than other large businesses.
Even if banks were inclined to expand into nonbanking businesses for
anticompetitive purposes, there is no reason to believe that existing antitrust
laws would be inadequate to restrain them. Indeed, in two respects, the antitrust
laws may be more restrictive with respect to vertical restraints involving banks
than nonbanking firms. First, the antitrust standard that applies to applications
by bank holding companies or their affiliates to engage in nonbanking activities
under section 4 of the BHCA is "whether ... performance [of the nonbanking
function] by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be expected to
produce benefits to the public . . . that outwdigh possible adverse effects, such
as ... decreased or unfair competiton .... ,,"4" Unlike the analogous provisions
in section 3 of the BHCA and in section 1 of the Bank Merger Act'
44 that
apply to administrative review of bank acquisitions and bank mergers, the
language of section 4 does not paraphrase the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The
Board, therefore, should be free to apply a more stringent standard of antitrust
review to acquisitions of nonbanking interests by a bank holding company than
in review of bank acquisitions or in review by other antitrust enforcement agencies
in nonbanking contexts.
45
141. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 190-203, 850-853 (3d.
ed. 1981) (presenting a critical introduction to the debate). Evidence that geographically diversified
banks have been unsuccessful in discouraging new market entry by competitors indicates that
predatory pricing has not been used successfully as an anticompetitive strategy in credit markets.
See Curry & Rose, Diversification and Barriers to Entry: Some Evidence from Banking, 29
Antitrust Bull. 759 (1984) (concluding there is no support for the theory that geographically
diversified banking organizations impede market entry).
142. See Bailey & Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, I YALE
J. REo. 111, 112-19 (arguing that supernormal profits cannot be made over the long run 
if
entry and exit from the market are easy).
143. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982). Section 7A(c)(8) of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(8) (1982), provides that all information and documentary
material regarding acquisitions subject to approval by the Board be "contemporaneously filed
with the Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant Attorney General at least 30 days prior
to consummation of the proposed transaction." Id. In practice, the FTC and the Department
of Justice rarely or never intervene in BHCA § 4(c)(8) applications.
144. Act of Feb. 21, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, § 1, 80 Stat. 7 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1828(c)(5) (1982)).
145. Although in Mercantile Texas the Fifth Circuit loosely referred to acquisitions by
bank holding companies in holding that the Board was prohibited from applying a more stringent
standard of antitrust review than permitted under the Clayton Act, Mercantile Tex. Corp. v.
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Second, the 1970 amendments to the BHCA added provisions considerably
more prohibitory than the law applied to nonbanking entities. 1" that specifically
forbid tying extensions of credit by a bank to the purchase of its products or
services from the bank or from any affiliate of the bank. As with analogous
law arising under the Clayton and Sherman Acts, these provisions may be
enforced by actions brought by government or private litigants for injunctive
relief. 4 7 Any person "injured in his business or property" is provided an express
cause of action for treble damages.' 4 Unlike causes of action arising under the
Clayton or Sherman Acts, however, a plaintiff relying on the BHCA amendments
need not allege or prove either market power of the bank or substantial an-
ticompetitive effects.4 9
Rationalizing either the BHCA section 4(c)(8) antitrust standard or bank
antitying laws on the basis of conventional antitrust principles is difficult. In
the nonbanking world, horizontal restraints are subjected to more stringent
restrictions than vertical or conglomerate arrangements because the adverse wel-
fare implications of the former are more certain. 50 In banking, this hierarchy
is reversed: horizontal integration is reviewed under the standards of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts, but even then a horizontal integration may be approved
notwithstanding violation of the usual standards if offset by the benefits of
meeting "the convenience and needs of the community to be served.''5 Non-
banking integration either is prohibited directly or subjected to antitrust standards
that are more restrictive than those applied to transactions not involving banks
or to horizontal bank integration.5 2 Whatever the basis for the asymmetry,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 638 F.2d 1255, 1260-63 (5th Cir. 1981), the reliance
by the court on the statutory language of § 3 and the legislative history of the Bank Merger
Act of 1966 was appropriate only with respect to bank acquisitions.
146. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, Title !, §
106(b), 84 Stat. 1766 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1) (1982)).
147. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1976 (1982).
148. Id. § 1974.
149. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, 679 F.2d 242, 245 (11th
Cir. 1982) (dictum); E. SYMONs & J. WinrE, supra note 4, at 549. In contrast, § 3 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982), only reaches tying arrangements whose effect "may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce," id.,
and application of §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act to tying arrangements requires a showing
of "sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product and [that] a 'not insubstantial' amount of
interstate commerce is affected." Fortner Enter. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,
499 (1969) (quoting Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)).
150. The United States Department of Justice regards vertical mergers as "less likely than
horizontal mergers to create competitive problems ...." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER
GUIDELINES 36, reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4494 at 6879-18 (June 14, 1984).
Accordingly, scrutiny of proposed vertical mergers is less restrictive than for horizontal com-
binations. See, e.g., id. 4494.204, at 6880 (specifying that economic efficiencies attained by
merger are to be given greater weight in assessing vertical mergers than horizontal mergers); see
also supra note 134 (discussing the ambiguity of welfare consequences of vertical integration).
151. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1982).
152. See The Chase Manhattan Corp., Order Denying Acquistion of Dial Financial Corp.,
60 Fed. Reserve Bull., No. 2, 142 (Feb. 1974). (providing an example of a Board order denying
a nonbanking application under antitrust standards more stringent than permitted under the
Clayton or Sherman Acts). In Chase Manhattan, the Board denied the application of a major
New York bank holding company to acquire the nation's 21st largest independent finance
Separation of Banking and Commerce
however, the more stringent treatment of vertical restraints involving banks
makes less plausible concerns regarding anticompetitive practices as a justification
for the separation of banking and commerce.
3. Discouragement of Large Entities
Fear and distrust of banks, in particular large money center banks, has
been a continuing theme of American political history.
5 3 Like the owners of
large railroads and armaments manufacturers, bankers have been suspected of
pursuing clandestine, antisocial ends and, despite their relatively small numbers,
of having wielded enormous political influence.
54 Not surprisingly, these sus-
picions have been important in shaping banking laws, and they undoubtedly
have contributed to legislative support for restrictions on geographical expansion
of banks and for the separation of banking and commerce.' Presumably, "undue
concentration of resources" in the BHCA was, at least to some members of
Congress, an allusion to this theme and a code word signaling a populist attack
on banking power."16 In certain cases involving nonbanking acquisitions, the
company, primarily because the acquisition "involve[d] the issue of concentration in credit-
granting resources .... ." Id. at 144. This position would have been unsupportable under
conventional antitrust standards, because the national "credit-granting" industry probably is too
broad a market under standard principles, and the Board performed no analysis of market
shares. See Ginsburg, supra note 127, at 1274.
153. See B. HAMMOND, supra note 81, at 53-64 (describing the political debate over the
Bank of North America during the period 1785 to 1787 that led to repeal of its charter and
subsequent recharter under more restrictive terms); id. at 405-10 (discussing President Jackson's
exploitation of populist ideology to support his veto of the recharter of the Second bank of
the United States); id. at 605-30 (outlining the history of antibanking sentiment in the western
United States).
154. See L. Brandeis, Other Peoples' Money passim (1914) (positing a conspiracy by a
"Money Trust").
155. See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 92, at 515-519 (discussing Senator Carter Glass' "charge
of a bankers' conspiracy" which was used to mobilize popular support for reform proposals
eventually incorporated into the Glass-Steagall Act). An interesting variation on this theme
appeared at several points in the Senate hearings on proposed bank holding company legislation.
Several witnesses, including a United States Congressman, testified that banking aggregation
should be discouraged in order to defeat any attempt to establish a totalitarian state. See 1955
Senate Hearings, supra note 109, at 360 (statement of Rep. Multer arguing that the consolidation
of banking facilitated Communist takeover of Russian financial industry); id. at 109 (testimony
of W. J. Bryan, of the Independent Bankers Association of America, arguing that the consol-
idation of banking facilitated Nazi takover of German banking industry).
156. This supposition is buttressed by the legislative history of the 1956 Act which provides
some basis for inferring an intention on the part of Congress to enact a prophylactic against
bank mergers more stringent than conventional antitrust analysis would justify. During con-
gressional hearings that preceded the Act, the Third Circuit decided Transamerica Corp. v. Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953), holding that § 7 of the
Clayton Act applied to bank mergers. Id. at 165. The court also ruled, however, that the relevant
market for banking services was local and, therefore, notwithstanding Transamerica's dominant
holdings within the five state region, the Board had failed to demonstrate the "substantially
lessened competition" standard required for § 7 relief. Id. at 167. This result received considerable
attention in the Senate hearings with a number of witnesses complaining of the insufficiency
of then existing law to constrain the growth of such giant concerns. See, e.g., 1955 Senate
Hearings, supra note 109, at 125 (testimony of H. Harding, President of the Independent Bankers
Association for the 12th Federal Reserve District); id. at 106-07 (testimony of W. J. Bryan,
Independent Bankers Association of America); see also id. at 97-98 (presenting the exchange
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Board adverts to this meaning. For example, the Board has taken the position
that it will deny a BHCA section 4(c)(8) application by a major bank holding
company to acquire an interest in a joint venture whenever the proposed cov-
enturer is itself a substantial enterprise.117 The Board's stated reason for this
policy is that "close working relationships between large U.S. banking and
nonbanking organizations could lead to an undue concentration of economic
resources .. . .1,,5 Although the Board's rationale is inarticulate and its the-
oretical underpinnings hazy, this policy surely cannot be grounded in conventional
antitrust analysis because, for example, it bypasses the usual predicate question
of whether the parties would be likely to enter the market absent the joint
venture.
Whether, in fact, this super-antitrust policy has constrained significantly the
growth of the largest bank holding companies is questionable. Despite lower
population density and more substantial legal impediments to bank expansion
and lower population density in the United States, the concentration of com-
mercial bank assets in major bank holding companies in the United States exceeds
that in Germany and is not greatly less than in Japan or the United Kingdom. 5 9
between Senator Douglas of Illinois and R. Gidney, Comptroller of the Currency, on desirability
of checking growth of large banking organizations). It is reasonable to assume from the vast
amount of attention devoted to Transamerica Corp. that the framers fully intended a standard
of review more preclusive of consolidation than recognized under § 7 of the Clayton Act.
157. See Deutsche Bank AG, Order Approving Proposed Bookkeeping and Data Processing
Activities and Denying Proposed Finance, Loan Servicing, Leasing and Insurance Activities, 69
Fed. Reserve Bull., No. 5, 449, 451 (May 1981) [hereinafter Deutsche Bank AG]; BankAmerica
Corp., Order Denying Investment in Allstate International S.A., Zurich, Switzerland, 60 Fed.
Reserve Bull., No. 7, 517, 519 (July 1974). In the former case, the Board disapproved an
application to permit a joint venture equally owned by Deutsche Bank, AG, the largest bank
holding company in Germany (and the third largest in the world), and Fiat S.P.A., the Italian
auto maker and diversified industrial manufacturing company, from expanding de novo into a
variety of financial services. Although recognizing that "the introduction of services de novo
by a joint venture generally has pro-competitive effects where both joint venturers are not likely
entrants into the market ... the Board found that the close working relationships between
large U.S. banking and nonbanking organizations could lead to an undue concentration of
economic resources, and ... would not be consistent with the purposes of the Bank Holding
Company Act, or in the public interest." Deutsche Bank AG, supra at 451. In the latter case,
the Board denied an application by the then largest banking organization in the United States
to acquire a 50% interest in a joint venture with Allstate Insurance Company to operate a Swiss
insurance underwriter engaged in business only in Europe. The Board justified its decision on
the grounds that "[c]lose working relationships abroad between large U.S. banking organizations
. or] large U.S. insurance companies could in time weave a matrix of relationships between
the joint venturers in the U.S. and abroad that could lead to an undue concentration of economic
resources in the domestic and foreign commerce of the United States." BankAmerica, supra,
at 519.
158. Deutsche Bank AG, supra note 157, at 451.
159. In Germany, the three major credit banks control approximately 13-14% of total
"universal" bank assets, while in both Japan and the United Kingdom, the 13 major banks
hold approximately 50% of all bank deposits. See Goodman, Cumming & Kumekawa, supra
note 8, at 86, 95, 101. In contrast, in 1984, the three largest bank holding companies in the
United States controlled somewhat more than 16% of commercial bank assets and the largest
13 companies controlled about 37%. See Bank Scoreboard, Bus. Week, March 22, 1985, at 104;
71 Fed. Reserve Bull., No. 10, Table 1.25, at A18 (Oct. 1985).
The relative insensitivity of concentration to legal structure probably is due in part to the
limited economies of scale in banking, which are exhausted at a relatively small scale. See King,
Interstate Expansion and Bank Costs, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev., May 1983, at
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In particular, the impact of restrictions on expansion into nonbanking businesses
on holding company growth probably is minimal. Economies of scope-reductions
in cost that may be attained by joining the production of related goods within
a single firm-from joint provision of multiple financial services appear to be
small '60 and logically should be no more substantial for most nonfinancial
businesses. The limited scale of such economies strongly implies that the banking
industry would not, without regulatory controls, experience such extensive con-
glomeration with nonbanking industries so as to affect aggregate economic
concentration.' 61 This conclusion is supported by experience prior to the adoption
of the BHCA162 and the current experience with unregulated one-thrift holding
companies. In any event, were bank holding company size alone the issue, the
goal could be attained much more effectively by direct regulatory restraints on
growth than by indirect controls on engagement in collateral lines of business.
Perhaps hostility toward "undue concentration of resources" reflects not
mere distaste for large size, but a special concern with the potential political
power of large enterprises that encompass both banking and commercial functions.
Why concerns regarding political power should result in laws specifically directed
at banking conglomerates is unclear. Such large integrated enterprises, businesses
with thousands of employees and billions of dollars in committed assets, probably
would have significant access to the political process. Nevertheless, in politics,
disproportionate influence usually is attained by intense commitment to a narrow
set of objectives and, in this respect, large diversified conglomerates may be
something less than the sum of their constituent firm parts. Indeed, some of
the most successful and socially costly lobbying has been conducted by trade
associations on behalf of large industries comprised of small firms with ho-
mogeneous interests.'6 Conglomerates that span a range of industries are more
likely to internalize both the costs and benefits of interindustry redistributions
and, therefore, to oppose especially insignificant programs and to exhibit am-
bivalence toward particular subsidy proposals. Even where size promotes the
40. King surveyed empirical studies of cost structures for unit and branch banks and for bank
holding companies and concluded that "diseconomies of scale exist for institutions of all sorts-
branch and unit, affiliate and nonaffiliate-above relatively low levels of overall size." Id. at
44; see also 1984 CEA Report, supra note 102, at 158 (stating that minimum costs for depository
institutions to provide traditional banking services are attained by institutions in the $50 million
to $100 million asset range). Given this cost structure, the existence of large banking institutions
likely is due to the needs of large customers, who may experience economies dealing with a
single bank. If this hypothesis is correct, then the growth of very large banks may not have
been constrained significantly by geographical market restrictions, since convenient location is
relatively unimportant to such customers.
160. See Benston, Berger, Hanweck & Humphrey, Economies of Scale and Scope in Banking,
in Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, at 432, 450-52 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Chicago 1980) (concluding from econometric analysis that interproduct cost compli-
mentaries are not substantial for financial products of banks).
161. Absence of economies of scope is not dispositive of whether extensive conglomeration
would occur if permitted. There are other reasons why banks might integrate with nonbanking
businesses, including customer economies and reduction of firm-specific business risks. See infra
text accompanying notes 218-231. Nevertheless, the structure of costs probably is the single most
important determinant of industry structure. It is implausible that substantial aggregation would
occur if there were significant diseconomies of scope.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 114-115.
163. The dairy industry and rural electrical cooperatives come to mind.
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pursuit of self-interest, there is no evidence that affiliation with a bank is more
helpful than affiliation with any other large business.
D. The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 and
Neutrality in the Allocation of Banking Resources
Although the BHCA, as enacted in 1956, closed one regulatory "gap," it
opened another. The BHCA applied only to holding companies that controlled
two or more banks. Independent banks were free to reorganize as one-bank
holding companies and to engage in commercial activities through nonbanking
subsidiaries free of BHCA restrictions. Just as the Federal Reserve Board had
campaigned to close the perceived holding company loophole in 1955, it pressed
to end the statutory exception for one-bank holding companies in 1969. The
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, William
McChesney Martin, Jr., testified before the House Committee on Banking and
Currency that the one-bank exception "has become a loophole of such magnitude
that unless it is closed there is no possibility of effectively enforcing the [BHCA]'s
restrictions on combining nonbanking businesses with banking .... , Testi-
mony indicated a dramatic increase in the deposits held by one-bank holding
companies after 1955 and a significant, but much smaller, growth in nonbanking
assets controlled by such companies. 16
Again, the term "conflicts of interests" was used to describe the target of
legislative reforms. In 1955, the focus of congressional concern had been primarily
on Transamerica Corporation and the apparent inadequacy of conventional
antitrust law to constrain the growth of gigantic integrated holding companies.
However, in 1969, the fear was directed at "conflicts of interests" in yet another
sense: the putative disincentive of integrated banking firms to lend to competitors
of their nonbanking affiliates. '" The fear was not of the adverse political and
economic effects of size, but of the competitive strangulation of smaller businesses
that were unaffiliated with banks because of foreclosure from capital markets.
Although the danger was seen from a different perspective in 1969 than in
1955, it was underpinned by the same naive belief that a bank's involvement
164. Hearings on H.R. 6778 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 200-01 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 House Hearings].
165. Between 1955 and 1968, deposits of one-bank holding companies grew from $11.6
billion to $108.2 billion, while assets in manufacturing and mining industries controlled by such
banks increased by $47.2 billion. Id. at 352, Table I (statement of Harrison F. Houghton, Chief
of Economic Evidence of the Federal Trade Commission).
166. See, e.g., id. at 15 (statement of Professor A. A. Berle); id. at 196-97 (statement of
William McChesney Martin). The focus on bank conflicts in this third sense in the 1969 Hearings
apparently is consistent with the assertion of some authorities that "economic neutrality" in
the allocation of credit should be recognized as a fundamental justification for limitations on
the engagements of banks in nonbanking businesses. See E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note
4, at 172-73; Symons, supra note 36, at 714-18. Casting the policy underlying the separation
of banking and commerce in the jargon of welfare economics in this way, however, is perverse.
"Economic neutrality" requires that government tax and regulatory policies do not discourage
allocation of capital to the use which has the highest economic return, appropriately adjusted
for non-diversifiable risks. The separation of banking and commerce, by preventing the parties
to an investment contract from allocating risk and return between them, distorts behavior, and
results in a nonneutral allocation of capital.
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with a nonbanking business will tend to result in a distorted investment choice
favoring bank-owned businesses. Although statistics presented to Congress showed
an increase in the use of the unitary bank holding company structure, no evidence
was presented that the phenomenon either hindered access to loans by competitors
unaffiliated with banks or promoted allocational inefficiency. This is not sur-
prising because a bank that unreasonably prefers its own affiliates necessarily
suffers diminished earnings and because the competitive nature of the commercial
loan market makes significant impact on competing commercial businesses un-
likely. 16
7
IV. PRO-MITIONS ON ENGAGEMENT IN NONBANKING BUSINESS TO DETER
ExcEssrvE RISK-TAKING
Although low failure rates in banking for the half century following en-
actment of Glass-Steagall temporarily erased bank soundness from the menu of
congressional concerns, the dramatic increase in the number of bank failures
over the last several years again has made bank solvency a primary focus of
bank regulation. Circumstances of the present "crisis", however, are far different
from those of 1933. Following the Great Crash, primary concern justifiably was
directed at banking panics and their implications for the banking and monetary
system, employment, and output. In contrast, public perceptions of bank solvency
no longer threaten the federally insured banking system with the certainty of
bank panic and the possibility of banking collapse. Instead, concerns today with
respect to bank failure relate to the adequacy of the deposit insurance funds
and, much more importantly, to the efficiency with which depositories allocate
capital. The former problem, although potentially serious, could be solved rel-
atively easily by a modest increase in deposit insurance premiums.168 The latter
problem, however, is more difficult and more important. A significant body of
theoretical and empirical evidence has been accumulated indicating that capital
intermediation by banks may not be efficient with serious repercussions for
economic well-being.
A. Deposit Insurance and Risk-Taking
The primary cause for concern over excess bank risk is widely acknowledged
to be the very tonic that cured the banking maladies of 1933-federal deposit
insurance. 69 Simply put, because deposit insurance premiums are not risk-re-
167. See supra text accompanying notes 136-138.
168. Even today, expenses of the FDIC are only a small fraction of the assets of insured
banks. See supra note 104.
169. The influence of deposit insurance on the riskiness of depositories has been extensively
noted in the finance and banking literature. See Sharpe, Bank Capital Adequacy, Deposit Insurance
and Security Values, in S. MAISEL, RISK AND CAPITAL ADEQUACY IN COMMERCIAL BANKS 187
(1981); Buser, Chen & Kane, Implicit and Explicit Prices of Deposit Insurance and the Bank
Capital Decision, in Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, at 174
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago 1980); Flannery, Deposit Insurance Creates a Need for Bank
Regulation, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Bus. Rev., Jan./Feb. 1982, at 17; Kareken & Wallace,
Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilib'rium Exposition, 51 J. Bus. 413 (1978);
Litan, Evaluating and Controlling the Risks of Financial Product Deregulation, 3 YALE J. REG.
1 (1985); Merton, On the Cost of Deposit Insurance When There are Surveillance Costs, 51 J.
Bus. 439 (1978).
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lated,' 71 a depository institution has an incentive to undertake more risky in-
vestments than it would choose in a world without such deposit insurance. This
property of deposit insurance is illustrated by graphs drawing on the concepts
of portfolio theory.1'7
Figure 1 illustrates the choice of a preferred portfolio of assets for a bank
or other depository institution with and without federal deposit insurance. For
simplicity, the institution is assumed to be capitalized with equity and deposits
in a fixed ratio regardless of insurance status. 72 Curve NN" represents the locus
of points in the risk-return space comprising the boundary of the risks and
returns to the bank corresponding to all feasible bank investments without federal
170. Under current law, an insured bank pays a premium of one-twelfth of one percent
of its "assessment base" (i.e., deposit liabilities subject to certain adjustments) each year and,
subsequently, receives a credit equal to 60% of its pro rata share of the amount by which total
assessments exceed actual losses and operating costs of the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b), (d)
(1982). Analogous provisions govern FSLIC charges to thrifts. Id. § 1727(b) (1982). In addition
to the annual insurance premium, the FSLIC has exercised its statutory powers to levy a special
annual assessment of one-eighth of one percent to cover current operating losses. Id. § 1727(c)
(1982).
171. See K. GARBADE, SECURITIES MARKETS 111-78 (1985) (presenting a rigorous development




172. An insured depository institution will have the incentive to leverage its deposit-capital
ratio as high as regulators will permit. While this generally is not true without deposit insurance,
the ratio is assumed to be fixed exogenously to simplify the comparison.
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deposit insurance. At point N, the entire bank portfolio would be invested in
the least risky asset, presumably government bonds, and the portfolio would
yield an expected rate of return on equity in the period r, with an expected
standard deviation, s. Holding government bonds is not risk free because,
although the default risk is negligible, the net rate of return varies with the
difference between interest rates on deposits and bond yields. Point N" cor-
responds to complete investment in the riskiest available asset. The return on
equity declines between ERN and N" because, over this range, marginal increases
in the return on progressively riskier portfolios are assumed to be less than the
risk premium charged the bank by uninsured depositors. The solid portion of
the boundary curve N'E,,,, represents the efficient frontier of feasible combinations
of investments that are not dominated by portfolios of equal or lesser risk with
higher return.'
7
The depository institution chooses its portfolio of holdings to maximize its
utility from among the portfolios on the efficient frontier. Utility preferences
are illustrated by the family of indifference (iso-utility) curves I,, I2, and I3 of
successively higher utility. Each indifference curve represents the locus of all
points in the risk-return space representing equally desirable bank portfolios.
The shape of these indifference curves is generally convex, consistent with the
usual assumption that the institution is risk-averse'
174 and the optimum portfolio
is determined uniquely at the point of tangency, E,.. Were the institution risk
neutral, the indifference curves would be horizontal lines and the optimum
portfolio would be that yielding the highest net return, at point ER. In the
perverse case of risk-seeking behavior, the indifference curves would be concave
and the optimum would lie on the portion of the frontier between ERN and
N".
173. Note that the portfolio representing complete investment in the least risky asset generally
is not on the efficient frontier. As long as the correlation of the return on some other assets
with the return on the least risky asset is low enough, expected return can be increased and
variance simultaneously reduced by portfolio diversification. The gross expected return, R,, from
a multi-asset portfolio is the simple weighted average of the expected returns on its constituent
investments:
R. = E xR,
where R, is the return on the ith asset and x, is the fraction of the total portfolio invested in
that asset, so that Ex, = 1. R, always will rise when a second asset is added to a portfolio
comprised of complete investment in the least risky asset. The standard deviation of the multi-
asset portfolio is given by the formula:
s = ( 1 x x, C,,)/2
where C,, is the covariance of the return on the ith and jth assets and Ck, is the variance of
asset k. As long as there exists an asset whose covariance with the minimum risk asset is
sufficiently low, the standard deviation of the portfolio can be reduced by diversification. An
uninsured bank will, of course, prefer a portfolio that offers a higher gross return and has
lower risk, because its net return on capital will be higher with such a portfolio.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 184-185 (setting forth reasons for business entities'
risk-averse behavior).
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Under the system of flat-rate federal deposit insurance, the efficient portfolio
frontier shifts to D'D". The frontier steepens because of the relative impact of
two factors on bank income: the cost of the deposit insurance premium and
the savings on interest payments to depositors. For low-risk portfolios, the
savings on deposit interest will less than offset the insurance premium and net
return on bank equity will be reduced by participation in the insurance system.
Conversely, for high-risk portfolios, insurance premiums will be less than the
savings in interest payments to depositors and net returns will be increased. The
shift in the efficient frontier induces the bank to reform its asset portfolio to
assume more risk: a risk-averse management will move to an equilibrium like
ED; a risk-neutral or risk-seeking management will shift all the way to D", the
highest-risk and highest-return portfolio. 17s Intuitively, flat-rate deposit insurance
encourages risk-taking for two reasons. First, an insured bank can appropriate
all of the increased expected return usually associated with bearing increased
risk because, although the insurance fund actually sustains part of the increased
risk, it charges nothing for doing so. In effect, low-risk banks cross-subsidize
high-risk banks. Second, deposit insurance distorts the bank's perceptions of
the risk and return of various investments, which tends to favor riskier assets.
Any increased downside loss exposure from marginal increases in risk is borne
by the insurance fund, while the upside always fully accrues to the depository. 76
The distorting effect of deposit insurance increases as bank capital declines.' 77
Indeed, in extremis, insured banks with negative net worths may become risk
seekers and undertake investments with negative expected returns. While all
175. This, of course, is only true where the insurance premium does not reflect the insured
institution's portfolio risk as with flat-rate insurance. Were the federal insurance agencies able
to monitor perfectly the riskiness of bank investment portfolios, and to charge an actuarially
fair premium that reflected the riskiness of each bank's portfolio, this problem of "moral
hazard" would disappear. Accordingly, some commentators have proposed that the deposit
insurance system require risk related premiums. See, e.g., Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation
in Banking: Some Proposals for Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REv. 857, 886-
92 (1971). However, others, citing problems of measuring and monitoring portfolio risk, have
argued that insurance reforms are unlikely to curb substantially excessive risk taking. See, e.g.
1984 CEA Report, supra note 102, at 166-67.
176. Consider the possible "investment" in a bet on a spin of an actuarially fair roulette
wheel, i.e., one with an equal chance of a red or a black, that results in a gamble in which
a winning bettor doubles its bet. The economic return on such an "investment" is zero, but a
bank 90% capitalized with insured deposits would have an expected rate of return of [(.5)(200%
- 90%) + (.5)(0%)J/(10qo - 1), or 45007o. The return comes at the expense of the federal
insurance fund, which suffers an expected loss on the transaction exactly equal to the bank's
expected gain. Nevertheless, under the existing system of flat-rate insurance premiums, the fund
cannot charge for the marginal risk entailed in the bank's speculation.
177. Thin capital has become an acute and widespread problem in the thrift industry. As
of Dec. 31, 1984, 71 thrifts with aggregate assets of more than $12 billion reported negative
net worths using regulatory accounting principles. Barth, Brumbaugh, Sauerhaft & Wang, In-
solvency and Risk-Taking in the Thrift Industry: Implications for the Future, CONTEMP. POL'Y.
Iss., 1, 7 (Fall 1985). Another 806 thrifts with aggregate assets of almost $300 billion had capital
equal to 307o or less of total assets. Id. Staff economists at the FHLBB estimate that, using
generally accepted accounting principles, 434 thrifts with total assets of more than $107 billion
would have reported negative net worths as of Dec. 31, 1984. Id. Even these figures may
understate the problems, because usual accounting practices do not revalue assets and liabilities
to reflect interest rate changes, and thrift asset portfolios still contain a significant volume of
low-interest mortgages.
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entities develop strong incentives to seek risks near bankruptcy, such behavior
is particularly pronounced in banks because their liquidity facilitates redeployment
of assets in risky ventures, and insured depositors, unlike creditors of other
kinds of institutions, have no incentive to constrain management excesses.
B. The Separation of Banking and Commerce and Risk-Taking
The tendency of insured depository institutions to take superoptimal risks
with their portfolios may be exacerbated by permitting banks to engage in
nonbanking businesses. Engagement in a nonbanking business may be regarded
as an investment in a portfolio asset with an expected rate of return and standard
deviation characteristic of other firms in the nonbanking business' industry and
analyzed using the tools of portfolio analysis. 78 In Figure 2, B'B" represents
the envelope curve of efficient portfolios on the assumption that banks are
permitted to engage in nonbanking businesses. B'B" dominates A'A" because
lifting the separation of banking and commerce would permit more potential
allocations of the bank portfolio, for example, by investing in equity securities,





As one would expect, permitting banks to engage in nonbanking businesses
generally increases the economic welfare of banks. Fewer restrictions mean more
178. Portfolio analysis first was applied to explain the conglomerate merger wave of the
1960s as a means of reducing the relative variance of intracorporate cash flows. See Lewellen,
A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger, 26 J. FIN. 521, 521 (1971). Subsequently,
a number of scholars have applied portfolio analysis to the analysis of bank holding companies.
See Heggestad, Riskiness of Investments in Nonbank Activities by Nonbank Holding Companies,
27 J. ECON. & Bus. 219 (1975); Litan, supra note 169, at 10-19; Meinster & Johnson, Bank
Holding Company Diversification and the Risk of Capital Impairment, 10 BELL J. ECON. 683
(1979).
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opportunities for banks to invest capital more profitably. In Figure 2, the new
equilibrium portfolio E, is preferred to (that is, is on a higher indifference curve
than) EA. The questions of whether the new equilibrium will have a higher
standard deviation and whether, even if it does have a higher standard deviation,
the chances for bank insolvency in the period are greater are theoretically
indeterminate. This can be shown graphically by considering the line segments
which intercept the Y axis at -C, where C is the fraction of shareholders'
equity in total institutional assets and the two equilibria, EA and E,, respectively.
The greater the slope of each line segment, the lower the probability of bank
failure in the period. 7 9 Thus, as drawn, expanding the set of portfolio oppor-
tunities by permitting banks to engage in nonbanking businesses has resulted in
a reduction in the probability of bank failure. Depending on the shapes of the
investment possibility frontier and indifference curves, however, elimination of











179. More formally, the least upper-bound on the probability of failure is proportional to
the square of the reciprocal of the slope of the line segment. This follows directly from the
theorem of Blair and Heggestad. Blair & Heggestad, Bank Portfolio Regulation and the Probability
of Bank Failure, 10 J. MoNEY, CREDIT & BANKING 88, 88-91 (1978) (analyzing the restriction
of risk exposure in bank asset portfolios). A number of studies addressing risk in banking
compare the coefficients of variation of earnings, the ratio of standard deviation to mean
earnings, or sir, among various banking organizations as a measure of risk. See Litan, supra
note 169, at 11-19. Graphically, the coefficient of variation is the inverse of the slope of a line
segment between the origin and the point in the risk-return space corresponding to the institution's
performance characteristics. A higher coefficient of variation, i.e., a lower slope, necessarily
implies a higher probability of operating losses. It does not necessarily imply however, a greater
likelihood of bankruptcy. As long as the depository institution has positive capital, some asset
portfolios with a higher coefficient of variance will present a smaller chance of balance sheet
insolvency. As long as the institution maintains a sufficient portion of its assets in readily
marketable form such that it is able to survive a period of negative cash flow, the coefficient
of variation is not the appropriate measure of bank risk. Thus, Litan's conclusion that 16 of
31 bank holding companies have higher aggregate coefficients of variance than their banking
subsidiaries, id. at 22-23, does not necessarily imply that a majority of these bank holding
companies are in greater risk of bankruptcy than their banking subsidiaries.
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The theoretical indeterminacy of the effect of the abolition of the separation
of banking and commerce on the probability of bank failure is confirmed generally
by empirical studies of holding companies that have diversified within the bounds
of existing law. All such studies indicate that diversification has a mixed effect
on the riskiness of individual banking institutions.' 0 This does not mean however,
that the implications of line-of-business diversification on the aggregate rate of
bank insolvencies are ambiguous. Historically, the failure rate of depository
institutions has been extremely low.18 1 A policy change that increases the prob-
ability of failure for some institutions and decreases it for others is more likely
to increase than to decrease the aggregate failure rate for two reasons.
First, since the current rate is almost at the lower bound of zero, a policy
change that increases the dispersion of failure probabilities among individual
banks is likely to induce more failures than it prevents. Second, the current
low rate of bank failures undoubtedly is due in part to constraints on risk-
taking behavior imposed by banking regulators. To the extent that integration
of banking and commercial activities would make such regulatory supervision
more problematic, it is likely to result in more risk-taking.'
82
C. Welfare Consequences of Risk-Taking Behavior by Banks
Abrogation of the separation of banking and commerce would increase the
profitability of banking by increasing the return on bank assets. If it also induced
a pattern of bank investment with lower institutional risk, it would be preferable
unambiguously to continuing line-of-business prohibitions. The converse is not
true for two reasons. First, even if ending the separation increased undesirable
risk-taking, the benefit from increasing the return on banking assets, from a
welfare standpoint, may outweigh the harm of additional risk. Second, more
risk-taking may not necessarily be undesirable. There is good reason to believe
that business firms generally exhibit greater aversion to risk-taking than is socially
desirable, and adoption of some policies that induce risk-taking may be appro-
priate. '8
The reason for excessive risk-aversion among private businesses is the sen-
sitivity of business managers to firm-specific risks.'1 An investor with a well-
180. See, e.g. Boyd, Hanweck & Pithyachariyakul, Bank Holding Company Diversification,
in Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, at 105, 112-13 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Chicago 1980); Boyd & Graham, Risk, Regulation, and Bank Holding Company
Expansion into Nonbanking, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Q. Rev., at 2, 11-15 (Spring
1986); Litan, supra note 169, at 22-34; Wall & Eisenbeis, Risk Considerations in Deregulating
Bank Activities, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev., at 6, 13-17 (May 1984).
181. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1985 Annual Report, Table 122, at 53
(showing the number and deposits of failed banks); id. at 64, Table 129 (showing the total
deposits of insured banks).
182. This Article argues below that the degree to which the separation simplifies bank
regulation is minimal and, in any event, the benefits from regulatory change outweigh any
additional administrative costs that would be incurred to compensate for relaxation of nonbanking
constraints. See infra text accompanying notes 194-203.
183. See Tussing, The Case for Bank Failure, 10 J. L. & EcoN. 129, 146-47 (1967) (arguing
that overly zealous risk regulation leads to an inefficient banking sector).
184. Modern finance theory distinguishes two kinds of investment risk. "Systemic" or
"undiversifiable" risk refers to the variation in security values associated with general changes
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diversified portfolio will seek to maximize expected return almost irrespective
of the expected variance of individual firms because, in the aggregate, fluctuations
of individual firms in the portfolio can be expected approximately to cancel out
for reasons uncorrelated to market-wide phenomena. The owners of a closely
held business, however, generally are unable to diversify their investments suf-
ficiently to disregard expected volatility in the firm's earnings. In the absence
of actuarially fair insurance against adverse operating results, such owners will-
ingly pay a self-insurance "premium" by trading reductions in expected income
for lower variance in the income stream. Likewise, the officers of public cor-
porations frequently exhibit risk-averse behavior. Such officers generally have
an "investment" in both human and financial capital - for example, in job
skills and stock options - that cannot be diversified easily. Accordingly, although
the public stockholders may themselves own diversified portfolios and disregard
firm-specific risks, their agents, professional corporate managers, will not. Because
monitoring the conduct of corporate officers is costly, the public corporation
will exhibit greater risk-aversion than its stockholders desire.'
5 The tendency of
both private and public businesses to avoid firm-specific risks leads to lower
aggregate national income without any offsetting reduction in volatility.
18 6
The social cost of excessive risk avoidance by individual firms may be
substantial. For example, for each one-tenth of one percent annual "premium"
paid in reduced earnings on stockholders' equity to avoid firm-specific risks,
aggregate national earnings are reduced by more than $870 million dollars in
the manufacturing sector alone. 18 Some subsidies or regulations with substantial
in the value of all market securities. Such correlated changes in security values usually are the
result of changes in the macroeconomy, for example, changes in interest rates. The systemic
risk or "undiversifiable" of a particular investment is characterized by its "beta coefficient"
or "beta," the ratio of the proportional change in the value of the investment, ceteris paribus,
to a proportional change in general market values. A security with a higher beta is more volatile
because, other things being equal, it will exhibit larger price movements as average market values
change. "Specific" or "diversiflable" risk is the risk of fluctuations in security values from
causes which are particular to a firm or industry in the sense that they are uncorrelated to
general market fluctuations. Specific risks may be ignored by risk-averse investors because such
risks have minimal impact on a diversified portfolio. See K. GAR.ADE, supra note 171, at 213-
34 (presenting a rigorous development of the concepts of "undiversifiable" and "diversifiable"
risks).
A risk-seeking insured bank will not distinguish between "systematic" and "specific" risks
as long as it does not maintain a diversified portfolio. While the assumption of firm-specific
risk generally is restricted by statutes limiting the size of loans that may be extended to individual
borrowers and affiliated groups of borrowers, neither federal law nor the law of most states
requires interindustry diversification. See 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1982); 12 C.F.R. pt. 32 (1987). State
law generally parallels federal law in this regard.
185. The efficiency losses associated with the separation of management and ownership in
the modern corporation have been analyzed pervasively in the economics and finance literature.
See, e.g., Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 288 (1980);
Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FiN. ECON. 305 (1976).
186. Because bankruptcy reorganizations and employment dislocations have real costs, ceteris
paribus, social welfare is decreased by a higher rate of bankruptcies and, consequently, social
preferences are not completely indifferent to firm-specific risks. Nonetheless, the level of social
risk-aversion is considerably less than that of the private level because the coefficient of variation
in national income associated with such risks is negligible.
187. This result is based on total stockholders' equity in all manufacturing corporations
of $873.8 billion as of Sept. 30, 1985. See Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report
of the President, Table B-87, at 354 (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter 1986 CEA Report].
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costs may, therefore, be merited if they materially offset risk-averse behavior. 88
Thus, the separation cannot be justified on the basis of theory alone.
V. EVALUATING THE SEPARATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
I propose that a useful way to think about the separation of banking and
commerce is to consider the costs of alternative strategies. An optimal policy
for controlling risk taking by banks would minimize the sum of (i) the admin-
istrative costs of the policy; (ii) the social costs of excessive bank risk taking;
and (iii) the social costs of compliance with the regulations. Collectively, these
costs may be referred to as welfare costs. Precise measurement of these welfare
costs is impossible and even rough estimation requires some suspension of critical
standards. Nevertheless, the attempt to quantify them is useful because it high-
lights the tradeoffs that inhere in regulatory choices and may point in the
direction of desirable regulatory reforms. I begin this exercise by examining the
impact of the existing separation of banking and commerce on each category
of costs compared to a world without the separation. The conclusions drawn
from this section lead to certain proposals for regulatory reforms that are likely
to result in reducing total costs.
A. A Comparison of Bank Regulation With and Without the
Separation of Banking and Commerce
1. Administrative Costs
One argument made by banking regulators for the separation of banking
and commerce is that it reduces the administrative costs of safety and soundness
regulation. 18 9 This claim may be argued on several bases. First, it may be that
restricting bank portfolios to debt reduces the frequency with which they need
to be examined and makes examination easier. Second, focusing on the restriction
of entry of banks into new lines of business, rather than on regulation of
behavior subsequent to entry, arguably avoids both the administrative problem
of formulating and applying risk controls to numerous nonbanking businesses
and the political problem of attempting to constrain powerful vested interests
once they undertake such businesses.190 Third, enforcement and litigation costs
are asserted to be low.' 9' Violations are relatively easy to detect. The relevant
law is complicated and unsettled but, in practice, few banks ever exploit this
legal uncertainty by proposing to enter unconventional businesses or by chal-
188. Policies such as government-enforced patent monopolies and research and development
tax incentives have been defended on this ground. More recently, the Second Circuit has invoked
this analysis to rationalize the business judgement rule. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886
(1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
189. See 1984 CEA Report, supra note 102, at 160 (asserting that permitting banks to
engage in new lines of business may make regulatory supervision more problematic)
190. See Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. Rv. 1025, 1026
(1983) (discussing the difference between "gateway" regulation of new enterprises and supervisory
regulation of ongoing businesses in the context of health and safety regulation).
191. Id. at 1027.
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lenging regulatory interpretations. 92 Last, entry restrictions enjoy the enthusiastic
support of nonbanking competitors of regulated depositories who can be expected
to share the burdens of enforcement with the regulatory agencies.'
While not wholly without merit, these claims are overstated. Restrictions
on engagement in nonbanking businesses eliminate certain possible risky assets
from bank portfolios; they do not counter the distorting, effect of deposit
insurance on perceived rates of return. The problem of excessive risk-taking
does not arise solely because of managerial imprudence in choosing volatile
investments, but because deposit insurance induces banks to seek risk agres-
sively. Numerous business activities that lie at the core of the traditional
"business of banking" and involve neither direct engagement in a nonbanking
business nor ownership of corporate equity-including purchasing "junk bonds,"
financing leveraged buy-outs, and issuing standby letters of credit-can and
have been used by banks intent on cultivating portfolio risk. Indeed, given
federal deposit insurance, the incentive to load up on risky assets while observing
the separation of banking and commerce may result in adoption of an inferior
portfolio with increased likelihood of failure. 9
4 Consequently, the separation
of banking and commerce cannot substitute for other regulatory controls on
bank risk-taking, primarily bank examinations
95 and restrictions on interaffiliate
192. Given the size of the banking industry and the great complexity of banking law, the
volume of regulatory litigation is surprisingly low. As of Dec. 31, 1983, there were a total of
17,939 banks and thrifts in the United States with approximately S3.33 trillion in assets. See
Vice President's Task Group Report, supra note 22, at 102. Yet as of October 1987, according
to one survey, only 13 suits were pending in all courts involving issues of banking powers, and
only seven of these involved Glass-Steagall issues. See Bank Expansion Rep. (Golembe Assocs.
Inc.), Oct. 19, 1987, at 21-22 (listing bank-related litigation). Likewise, the administration of
entry into new businesses under the BHCA also is a very modest enterprise, with few burdensome
decisions to be made. Of the 577 applications to the Board for entry into nonbanking businesses
in 1985, 446 routinely were approved by local Federal Reserve banks under authority delegated
by the Board. See 1985 Fed. Reserve Ann. Report, supra note 28, at 177. The remaining
applications involved proposals referred to the Board as involving matters inappropriate for
decision under delegated authority. Of these, only three were denied. Id.
193. The plaintiffs challenging the right of a bank or bank holding company to enter a
line of business generally are individual competitors or trade associations of competitors in the
new line of business.
194. The portfolio chosen by a bank operating under the constraints of the separation
may be inferior in the sense that its true economic variance is higher and expected return lower
than that of a portfolio chosen from an unconstrained set of feasible portfolio allocations.
Indeed, even if the effect of the separation is to decrease portfolio variance, it may result in
a higher risk of insolvency, unless variance is decreased sufficiently to offset the increase in
failure probability caused by the reduced return. See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying
text.
195. The Comptroller of the Currency has the statutory authority to conduct examinations
of national banks. 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1982). The Board has examination powers with respect to
state member banks and bank holding companies. Id. §§ 325, 1844(c). The FDIC has examination
powers with respect to most insured banks. Id. § 1820(b). In addition, all states provide state
regulatory authorities the power to examine state banks. At the federal level, examination policies
and the training of examiners is coordinated by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council, whose membership consists of the Comptroller of the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC), a Governor of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
designated by the Chairman (FRB), the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB), and the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board (NCUAB).
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transactions. 96
There is little reason to believe that the application of these other regulatory
controls is made less costly by the separation. The frequency with which bank
examinations should be conducted is a function not just of the intrinsic volatility
of particular holdings, but of the speed with which bank management may
shuffle assets anong different holdings.'
97 There also is not much reason to
believe it is intrinsibally cheaper to value a portfolio restricted to debt securities.
Because the value of debt depends on the creditworthiness of the borrower and
the market value of collateral, the bank examiner is called on frequently to
undertake valuation procedures not unlike those that would be necessary to value
equity interests. 19
Finally, the willingness of bank competitors to bear the costs of enforcing
the prohibition on nonbanking activities hardly signals a social savings, but
rather merely a shift of the burden to private persons seeking to protect monopoly
rents. Presumably, private litigants enforce the separation to effect a barrier to
Id. §§ 3301-3308; 12 C.F.R. pt. 1101 (1986). See FDIC, Manual of Examination Policies (1986)
(providing a detailed description of examination procedures and objectives); see also J. SAVAGE,
BANK AUDITS AND EXAMINATIONS passim (1980) (detailing bank audit procedures).
196. Extensions of credit by member banks generally are limited to 10% of bank capital
per affiliate and a total of 20% of bank capital to all affiliates. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 1828(j)
(1982) (member banks and insured nonmember banks, respectively).
197. The liquidity of bank assets renders them particularly susceptible to conversion or
misapplication. According to an FDIC study covering the period from 1960 to 1974, 57%0 of
insured bank failures were due primarily to improper loans to insiders, 320o to defalcation,
embezzlement, or manipulation, and only 12% to deficient portfolio supervision. J. SINKEY,
PROBLEM AND FAILED INSTITUTIONS IN THE COMMERCIAL BANKING INDUSTRY 17 (1979). The
significant role of illegal or improper conduct as a cause of bank failure limits the reliance that
may be placed on voluntary regulatory compliance as a substitute for frequent bank examinations.
Indeed, were asset volatility the paramount regulatory concern, other regulatory devices would
be preferred to the separation. Bank portfolios could be restricted to only the least risky
securities-federal obligations and federally guaranteed debt. Alternatively, a simple rule per-
mitting more flexibility would be to place an earnings ceiling on bank income, for example, by
taxing returns on the bank portfolio above a specified rate of return at a marginal tax rate of
100016. Under such a constraint, the bank would have an incentive to min;mize portfolio variance
subject to earning the maximum permitted return, because increasing the -ariance on the return
of a portfolio whose expected rate of return was the maximum permitted %ould lower, expected
returns after tax. The effect would be analogous to the behavior of banks with respect to loan
portfolio management when subject to a binding usury ceiling. See Blitz & Long, The Ecomomics
of Usury Regulation, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 608 (1965) (analyzing the effect of usury legislation on
the bond and physical capital markets). If banks were permitted to own equity as well as fixed
interest rate debt, a tax would be preferable to direct regulation because the expected rate of
return on equity would not be observable directly ex ante. The tax would have to be levied on
unrealized appreciation and, consequently, the proposal probably is practicable only if banks
are permitted to own only marketable securities.
198. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Examination Circular 225, June 18,
1986 (presenting an example of the complex procedures necessary to value risky debt). The
circular addresses the valuatio'n of problem loans collateralized by oil and gas reserves, supplanting
policies adopted by the OCC, FRB, and FDIC in August 1984 that required classification of
loans according to the difference between the outstanding loan balance and anticipated future
revenues from oil and gas proceeds, calculated in part on prevailing spot market prices. Under
the new guidelines, examiners are encouraged to value loans, inter alia, on the basis of long-
term oil price scenarios developed with the assistance of in-house or independent petroleum
experts.
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entry against potential bank competitors.' 99 Expenditures to enforce regulations
against competitors are rational only if the regulations protect monopoly rents
or inefficiency, because there is no incentive to enter an efficient competitive
market .200 Thus, the existence of such suits is itself evidence of the social costs
of the regulations. Moreover, private litigation, because it has as its objective
private gain rather than the public interest, may be inefficient socially in that
the litigants will continue spending resources on litigation even when there is
no social gain.20'
Even if the separation of banking and commerce does make administration
of safety and soundness regulation marginally less expensive, the benefit gained
is small relative to the other costs associated with the rule and to the size of
the banking industry. The four principal federal banking agencies spent ap-
proximately $685 million in fiscal year 1985 supervising banks and thrifts,
approximately one-fiftieth of one percent of total assets of regulated depository
institutions.20 2 This sum covered expenditures on all bank regulatory functions,
including chartering, auditing, policy-making, and overhead. The administrative
costs of safety and soundness regulation are, presumably, some fraction of this
number, perhaps on the order of magnitude of one one-hundredth of one percent
of depository assets.2 03 Thus, a one basis point increase in the return on bank
capital from the opportunity to own equity and to engage in businesses from
which they are currently barred would offset a doubling of the costs of ad-
ministering safety and soundness regulations.
199. See, e.g., M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1382
(9th Cir. 1977); National Retailers Corp. of Ariz. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 411 F Supp. 308, 313
(D.C. Ariz. 1976); American Soc'y of Travel Agents v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav.
Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 1084, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
200. The existence of either or both abnormal costs and profits in regulated industries and
the symbiotic relationship between regulators and regulatees has been demonstrated in numerous
industries. See, e.g., L. KEYES, ENTRY IN AIR TRANSPORTATION 307-30 (1951) (airline regulation);
Moore, The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation, 21 J. L. ECON. 327 (1978) (trucking regulation).
201. See generally Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly
Legal System, 11 J. Legal Stud. 333 (1982) (discussing the differrence between private and social
costs and benefits of litigation).
202. Office of Management and Budget, Appendix to the Budget for Fiscal Year 1986, I-
R35 to I-R36, I-Y20 to I-Y22, I-Y27 to I-Y34, V 11 to V 12, V-15 to V-16. The total reflects
the budget estimates of total administrative expenses for the FDIC, the FHLBB including the
FSLIC, the OCC, and the Federal Reserve System comprised of both the Board of Governors
and the regional Federal Reserve banks. The total does not include transfer payments to insured
depositors or the cost of administering failed institutions.
203. The principal expense incurred in safety and soundness regulation is the expense of
periodic bank examinations. The seven federal financial regulatory agencies - the OCC, FRB,
FDIC, FHLBB, SEC, the NCUA, and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission - spent
an aggregate total of $237 million on examinations in 1982, with the three bank regulators
spending $73 million of the total. Vice President's Task Group Report, supra note 22, at 29
n.16. The latter figure constituted approximately .008% of total bank assets of $1.972 trillion
as of Dec. 31, 1982. 69 Fed. Reserve Bull., No. I, at A18 (Jan. 1983). There is good reason
to think that even this amount could be reduced substantially, because commercial banks presently
are examined by at least two, and as many as three, government agencies. See Vice President's
Task Group Report, supra note 22, at 29-30. The total excludes costs of complying with regulatory
requirements imposed on subject institutions. Since a depository always has the option of refusing
to avail itself of any new nonbanking powers, relaxation of the separation cannot make it worse
off. That is to say, no bank will undertake any permitted nonbanking activity unless expected
gross profits from the activity exceed expected additional regulatory costs from engaging in it.
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2. Costs of Excessive Bank Risk
The second category, the social costs of excessive bank risk-taking, subsumes
two very different elements. First, excessive bank risk may raise the direct costs
of bank insolvencies. Direct costs include the social costs of the expenditures
by the various banking regulators on administering falling and failed institutions
and the incremental expenses of bank customers and creditors of conducting
their affairs incurred because of the insolvencies, or threatened insolvencies, of
regulated banks. For the most part, these costs arise only when a depository
fails or comes very close to failure. Second, excessive bank risk taking-may
impose economic welfare costs because capital may not be allocated to its most
socially productive use. This loss ensues as a consequence of deposit insurance-
induced behavior regardless of whether any insured depository actually fails.
Although they have figured prominently in debates concerning banking policy,
the direct costs of bank failures are not large. 4 Few banks fail, and the real
costs to the regulatory agencies of administering those banks that do fail are
not great. Creditors of failed banks sustain few losses2 5 and, in most cases,
suffer minimal inconvenience.2 6
Relaxing the separation of banking and commerce would, moreover, not
necessarily increase the welfare burden of these expenses. Regulations that impede
bank risk-taking increase the return on risky enterprises relative to less risky
ones, and thereby induce nonbank investors to undertake greater risk and suffer
more bankruptcies.m Permitting banks to own equity would reduce the average
corporate debt to equity ratio and diminish the corporate failure rate. In any
event, like other administrative costs, the expenses attending failing or failed
204. Regulators tend not to break out the economic costs of bank failure, but to focus
on total budgetary costs to their agencies. See, e.g., Chief Economist Says Small National Banks
Performed Well Despite Failures, 47 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 161 (Aug. 4, 1986)
(reporting speech by director of economic and policy analysis for the OCC discussing, inter
alia, the costs of commercial bank failures). This perspective distorts the cost-benefit calculus
of bank risk-taking by treating transfer payments - subsidies to failing institutions and payments
to creditors of insolvent ones - as real costs and by ignoring offsetting changes in the bankruptcy
rates of nonbanking persons. Likewise, bank regulators tend to be insensitive to the social gains
and losses from changes in the efficiency of bank capital intermediation. Consequently, bank
regulators consistently overestimate the social costs of bank failures, and favor a rate of bank
failure that is lower than the social optimum.
205. Almost all the liabilities of small and medium sized commercial banks and thrifts are
insured deposits. 1984 CEA Report, supra note 102, at 168. Although a significant portion of
the liabilities of large depositories are uninsured, regulators have adopted policies that effectively
provide insurance coverage in full for all depositors in such institutions. See supra note 105.
Insured depositors have no risk-bearing costs, of course, because there is no risk.
206. Both the FDIC and the FSLIC are required statutorily to pay insured depositors "as
soon as possible" on default. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1728(b), 1821(0 (1982). In practice, the agencies
have provided access to the full amount of insured accounts either immediately or very shortly
after insolvency.
207. The typical depository reorganization has considerably lower transaction costs than
failures of other comparably sized businesses. The reorganization normally is completed in a
very short time, and courts have been extremely deferential to the federal insurance funds
regarding determinations of insolvency and actions as receivers. See Biscayne Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 720 F.2d 1499, 1502-05 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussing
limitations on judicial review of actions of the FHLBB and FSLIC committing a thrift to
receivership and becoming a receiver), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
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depositories are dwarfed by the total pool of bank assets, and marginal increases
in such costs from relaxation of the separation of banking and commerce would
be more than offset by minuscule increases in the efficiency of invested capital.2°0
Assessment of the consequences for economic welfare of changes in the
riskiness of bank portfolios is more problematic. Various distortions in investment
behavior with regard to risk have been identified, but their aggregate effect on
the overall allocation of capital has not been demonstrated. Studies of public
equity markets, for example, reveal a seemingly inefficient market preference
for risk,209 while studies of publicly traded debt tend to show excessive risk
aversion. 210 Similarly, although insured depositories are biased toward risk, owners
of private businesses and managers of public corporations tend to be overly
risk-averse. 2 1 Whether relaxation of the separation of banking and commerce
would move toward or away from the optimal level of systemic investment risk
cannot be predicted theoretically. 21 2
Even if the aggregate distribution of capital were misallocated toward ex-
cessive risk-taking, whether relaxation of the separation of banking and commerce
would significantly exacerbate the distortion is unclear. Influenced by flat-rate
deposit insurance, banks are motivated to increase asset risk, irrespective of
whether the additional risk is "systemic" or "specific". 2 3 Increases in specific
risk do not necessarily diminish social welfare, apart from the impact on the
rate of bank failures. 214 Moreover, current banking regulation seems to favor
bank investment in certain risky industries-agriculture, oil and gas drilling, and
housing and real estate development 2l 5-that have been governmental favorites.
208. See supra text accompanying note 187.
209. See, e.g., R. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS
47-59 (1st. ed. 1969).
210. Between 1974 and 1986, the default rate of publicly traded low-grade debt averaged
only 1.5% annually. Worthy, The Coming Defaults in Junk Bonds, Fortune, Mar. 16, 1987,
at 25, 29. Even on defaulted issues, investors usually lost only a part of their investment,
implying that the yield premium on such securities, which averaged more than 5% during the
period, was far higher than necessary to compensate investors for losses on risky assets. One
explanation of this disproportionate return on low-grade debt is that the legal restrictions on
the quality of assets that may be held by pension funds and other fiduciaries have distorted
the market by overpricing high-quality paper.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 183-186.
212. This, of course, is another example of the familiar proposition of welfare economics
that fulfillment of a competitive condition in one market may not increase well-being as long
as other conditions for a competitive equalibrium remain unsatisfied. See Lipsey & Lancaster,
The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11, 12 (1956).
213. See supra note 184.
214. Consider the risks associated with geographically restricted loan portfolios, for example,
the risks of a localized business recession. Such risks are "specific" because they can be eliminated
by diversification of the loan portfolio to include borrowers from other regions. A bank that
concentrates its loan portfolio within a single locality will have higher variance of asset values
than a lender that disperses its loan portfolio over a broader geographical range. Nevertheless,
even if every bank undertakes only local loans, the aggregate geographical allocation of capital
may be unaffected if banks are dispersed geographically.
215. Falling prices in agricultural commodities and oil and gas account for a substantial
percentage of current bank insolvencies, and problems with real estate loans and direct engagement
in real estate development also have plagued the thrift industry. Since summer 1984, more than
one-half of failed commercial banks in every quarter have been agricultural banks as defined
by the Board, although such banks comprise only 34% of all commercial banks. Melicher,
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These industry-specific subsidies tend to offset any risk-reduction effect of the
separation.
3. Costs of Regulatory Compliance
The final category of welfare costs, like the .second, is comprised of two
disparate elements: the out-of-pocket costs to depository institutions of observing
regulatory requirements, and the social welfare costs of excluding banks from
nonbanking businesses and prohibiting banks from owning corporate equity. The
behavior of regulatory authorities regarding these elements manifests a familiar
regulatory paradox: the former costs, although relatively insignificant, are in-
ternalized wholly by parties to the regulatory process and, consequently, weighed
carefully in the formation of regulatory policy; the latter welfare losses, although
of much greater significance, are diffused among numerous banking and non-
banking entities and, thus, receive little regulatory attention.
216
The out-of-pocket compliance costs of the separation are small because the
law is structured as a set of prohibitions with minimal individualized proceedings.
Most applications submitted to the Board under the BHCA to engage in a
nonbanking business-one of the few aspects of the separation involving case-
by-case determinations-were routine filings to engage de novo in activities
permitted by the regulations for which only a modest, and cheap, filing was
required.217 Even with the expenses of procuring routine legal advice and litigating
marginal cases, the total cost remains relatively small.
The costs of allocative inefficiency stemming from the separation appear
to be much larger. Enforcement of the separation diminishes economic welfare
in at least five ways. First, it limits economies of scale and economies of scope
in banking. That is, it prevents banks from achieving cost reductions by spreading
fixed costs over a larger volume of enterprises, and inhibits the development
of synergies from joint provision of banking and nonbanking services. Second,
the separation denies to bank customers certain economies otherwise realizable
Agricultural Banks under Stress, 72 Fed. Reserve Bull. No.7, 437, 437 (July 1986). Currently,
although regulatory authorities have refused to provide detailed statistics, oil and gas banks-
banks that have 25% or more of their loan portfolio in energy-related loans-are the focus of
considerable regulatory concern. See Volker Urges Garn-St. Germain Changes, Sees No Need
for Aid to Energy Banks, 46 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 535 (Apr. 7, 1986) (reporting
on the monitoring of energy banks by federal banking authorities). Nevertheless, congressional
debate has not focused on proposals that would encourage diversification of loan portfolios as
a solution to the problem of bank insolvencies. To the contrary, particularly with regard to
energy and agricultural banks, regulators have responded to pressure from Congress by adopting
policies that relax bank capital requirements for distressed institutions. See More Banks are
Eligible to Seek Capital Forebearance Under New FDIC, Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 2, at 42
(July 13, 1987) (reporting that the FDIC and OCC have agreed to expand their forebearance
to enforce bank capital requirements). The latter solution is a disguised subsidy, because it
would permit insolvent institutions to continue operating, and thereby increasing the expected
costs to the FDIC of a subsequent insolvency.
216. But see Executive Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1982) (requiring, inter alia,
that subject regulations "shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for
[sic] the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society ... .
217. See supra note 192.
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from consolidation of transactions among suppliers. 218 Third, it restricts bank
entry into some noncompetitive nonbanking markets and exacerbates the social
costs of monopoly power of firms in these markets. Fourth, the separation
inhibits the use of certain mutually advantageous financial contracts-equity
investments-and thereby raises the effective cost of capital and reduces aggregate
investment. Last, it exacerbates "agency" costs of the separation of ownership
and control in the public corporation.
Quantification of these losses is difficult. Empirical studies of the cost of
production of banking services do not provide a satisfactory basis for projecting
savings from engagement in nonbanking activities that currently are barred by
law. Assessments of the impact separation has on monopolistic practices in
nonbanking markets, the cost of capital, and agency behavior are speculative
at best. Nevertheless, considerable evidence has been accumulated to support
the proposition that economic gains from integrating banking and nonbanking
businesses would be substantial. 219 The emerging structure of financial markets
suggests that integration results in economies to banks and their customers.
Competitive markets tend to assume the structure that maximizes economic
welfare. 220 The financial services industry has been marked in recent years by
218. This benefit of integration sometimes is overlooked in expositions of the theory of
the firm because it is not an economy of production and, indeed, may even induce a pattern
of production that is not cost-minimizing within an industry. For example, one sees many
nongrocery products sold in supermarkets-cosmetics, hardware, over-the-counter drugs, etc.-
that are sold at prices higher than those of specialized competitors. Notwithstanding the higher
prices, many supermarket customers purchase these items because of the savings in time and
effort in consolidating their patronage in a single store. A regulation that prohibited supermarkets
from selling these items would have adverse welfare consequences even though supermarkets are
not the low cost purveyors of such products.
There are similar apparent benefits from consolidation of nonbanking businesses within
banking entities. For example, information developed for credit-rating purposes also would be
useful in pricing business insurance contracts. Yet, insurance underwriters are reluctant to accept
bank-supplied information without verification, because banks have an interest in promoting the
most favorable public perception of the solvency of their debtors. Verification expenditures of
the underwriter would be minimized if the credit and insurance functions were conducted by
the same, or related, firms because self-interested behavior would not encourage information
distortion. See Bennett, Consumer Demand For Product Deregulation, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Atlanta Economic Rev., May 1984, at 28 (suggesting an analysis of the benefits of product
integration for a limited category of bank customers).
219. See Phillips, Competition, Confusion, and Commercial Banking, 19 J. FIN. 32 (1964)
(analyzing substantial inefficiencies in banking from low failure rates, the large number of firms
of less than optimal scale, and uncompetitive pricing practices).
220. Over the last decade, the views of mainstream economists about the competitive
significance of industrial aggregation has undergone a sea of change. Influenced by the 1950's
work of Joe Bain which purported to demonstrate that economies of scale generally were exhausted
at the plant level, many industrial organization economists of that era attributed business
consolidations primarily to anticompetitive motives. At the high tide of this view, in the 1960s,
economists labored to explain the on going conglomerate merger wave with intricate models of
oligopolistic behavior, or they dismissed the phenomenon as the product of imperfect capital
markets or deceptive accounting practices. In recent years, a revisionist school, relying on a
body of work demonstrating significant multiplant economies and the efficiency of capital markets,
has challenged the old orthodoxy with considerable success. There is now a pervasive, if somewhat
grudging, acceptance of the view that allocative efficiency plays a significant role in mergers.
Compare F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 133-38 (2d
ed. 1980) (identifying economic gains from mergers) with F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
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evolution towards integrated "financial supermarkets," and by a related trend
towards inceasing ownership of banks by nonfinancial corporations. " l Bankers
have lobbied vigorously for expanded powers, presumably because they believe
engagement in nonbanking businesses would increase bank profitability.m"
Evidence from markets where bank entry has been permitted corroborates
the implications of structural changes in financial markets. Bank competitors
have flooded into the discount brokerage business, pushing transaction com-
missions downward. 223 In New York and Massachusetts, where savings banks
may underwrite and sell life insurance, premium rates are consistently among
the lowest available. 224 Econometric studies indicate that hundreds of millions
STRUCTURE AND EcoNomIc PERFORMANCE 116-20 (1970) (critical treatment of claims that mergers
yield significant economic benefits to society).
Industrial organization studies have been complemented by empirical work of financial
economists. Numerous studies using market value data have demonstrated financial gains to
stockholders from mergers and acquisitions. See Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate
Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FiN. EcoN. 5 (1983) (surveying the market value studies).
Although the literature reviewed by Jensen & Ruback does not identify the source of appreciated
values in corporate acquisitions, neither increases in market power nor tax benefits-the two
most frequently posited alternatives-seem as likely to account for the observed gains as synergistic
improvements. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, see supra note 143 (discussing the Act),
acquisitions are subject to pre-merger clearance by the government, and most acquisitions either
involve conglomerate mergers or insignificant increases in market shares. A recent study showed
that tax benefits account for only a small portion of gains from merger. A. Auerbach & D.
Reishus, Taxes and the Merger Decision (1986) (National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 1855).
221. Within the last 15 years, the bank holding company has become the dominant form
of financial organization in the United States. Between 1970 and the end of 1983, the number
of holding companies increased from 121 to 5395. Vice-President's Task Group Report, supra
note 22, at 20-21. Bank holding companies now control more than 80% of commercial bank
assets. Id. at 103-04. During the same period, the number of banks controlled by an average
holding company has decreased from over 7.4 to less than 1.5, suggesting that this structural
change is motivated by the opportunity to expand nonbanking powers rather than to circumvent
state branching limitations. Id. at 21. The holding company movement has been complemented
by the increasing incidence of entry into financial services by nonbanking firms via acquisition
of a nonbank bank or single thrift subsidiary. See Litan, supra note 169, at 31-34 (discussing
the financial conglomeration movement).
222. The American Bankers Association reportedly has drafted and circulated proposed
legislation that would expand broadly banks' authority to engage in nonbanking businesses. See
ABA Attempts to Set Future Agenda with New Banking Powers Legislation, 47 Wash. Fin.
Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 88 (July 21, 1986).
223. Within months of the first entry by bank affiliates into the discount brokerage business,
hundreds of depository institutions had followed suit. See Note, National Banks and the Brokerage
Business: The Comptroller's New Reading of the Glass-Steagall Act, 69 VA. L. Rav. 1303, 1314-
15 (1983) (tracing the entry of banks into discount brokerage).
224. As of 1986, savings bank life insurance was available in three states: Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and New York, in amounts of up to $60,000, $30,000, and $250,000, respectively.
Of 41 term life insurance policies analyzed by the Consumers Union for ages 25 and 35, and
40 policies analyzed for age 45, New York Savings Bank Life Insurance (NYSBLI) was ranked
1st, 4th, and 7th in the three age groups, and Massachusetts Savings Bank Life Insurance
(MSBLI) was rated 8th, 1st, and 1st. See Life Insurance: How to Protect Your Family, 51
Consumer Rep., at 371, 387-91 (1986) (comparing $50,000 participating policies among various
companies). Among 40 whole-life policies analyzed, NYSBLI was ranked 1st in all six age and
gender categories, while MSBLI was ranked 5th, 3rd, and 4th for men, and 5th, 4th, and 3rd
for women, in the three age categories. See Life Insurance: Whole-Life, 51 Consumer Rep., at
447, 458-67 (1986) (comparing similar whole-life policies). Connecticut Savings Bank policies
were not rated because of the low policy maximums.
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of dollars in underwriting fees and interest could be saved annually by permitting
banks to underwrite municipal bonds. 25 Experience in states in which state banks
have been permitted to underwrite municipal bonds supports this conclusion.
22 6
Rescinding the prohibition on bank ownership of corporate equity should
bolster allocative efficiency for reasons unrelated to economies of production
and consumption. Existing law prevents the parties to a loan contract from
negotiating mutually preferable terms that permit the lender to exercise the
incidents of equity ownership. There are good reasons, however, why the parties
might prefer to structure bank financing as equity rather than debt.227 From a
bank's standpoint, becoming a stockholder may be an economical way to control
antagonistic interests of the borrower, including the incentive to undertake greater
risks than anticipated by the loan agreement. 228 The bank generally will have
information about client firms that is superior to other potential stockholders,
and it can monitor firm performance more cheaply. These cost savings from
superior information are likely to be shared with the issuer. This mutually
beneficial arrangement would increase the efficiency of capital intermediation
and reduce the cost of capital.229
225. See Hawk, Meaney, Schneider & Schott, Revenue Bond Underwriting by Banks: A
Panel Discussion, 2 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 53, 60 (1983) (reporting a survey of 12 econometric
studies predicting savings of from $50 million to more than S600 million).
226. A legal decision permitting national banks to deal in certain Georgia municipal bonds
stimulated a jump in bond prices, and reduced interest payments by 5%. Horvitz, Stimulating
Bank Competition Through Regulatory Action, 20 J. FiN. 1, 11 (1965). Interest payments are
a transfer payment, and the interest saved issuers by bank entry into the underwriting business
is not itself a measure of welfare loss. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the estimated reduction
in interest costs suggests that very substantial welfare gains are possible.
227. The choice of form of the investment relationship-debt or equity-poses the central
question of institutional economics: whether, in a world with transactions costs, to organize
production by contract or by hierarchy, i.e., within a firm. Extensive literature addresses this
question. See Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 390-98 (1937); see also
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L.
& EcON. 233, 259-60 (1979) (proposing criteria for distinguishing the preferred relationship).
228. In this respect, the incentives of the borrower are analogous to those of a depository
under a flat-rate insurance system: the benefits of increases on the upside of risky ventures
accrues to the stockholders as the owners of the residual interest in the corporation. The downside
risk is shared with creditors, including the bank lender. See supra text accompanying notes 170-
176. A bank loan agreement typically restrains some risk-taking, for example, by limiting debt
leveraging by the borrower, but any loan agreement will necessarily provide incomplete protection
to the lender, because it cannot anticipate every circumstance that permits additional risk-taking.
Where such a noncontractible situation exists, the investor will invest less money than it would
if it had held an ownership interest. Cf. Grossman & Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986) ("When it is too
costly for one party to specify a long list of the particular rights it desires . . . . it may be
optimal . . . to purchase all the rights except those specifically mentioned."). Direct equity
ownership offers the bank two advantages over loan contracts: (1) the bank has an interest in
the residual profits of the firm, and (2) the bank benefits from the stricter fiduciary obligations
owed by corporate management to its stockholders. The former advantage is, in effect, a hedge
against wealth transfers from debt-holders to equity holders; the latter may be an efficient
method of specifying management responsibilities. Abrogation of the separation also would
permit the bank to reduce monitoring costs, by having representatives on the corporate borrower's
board of directors.
229. Although the cost of capital also could be reduced by the usual tools of monetary
policy-open-market operations of the Federal Reserve or changes in the discount rate-the
result would be inferior to a policy change that spurred increased efficiency in capital inter-
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Permitting bank ownership of equity also should reduce the welfare losses
associated with agency behavior of corporate managers. The potential for cor-
porate takeover activity by banks would increase the disciplining effect of the
"market for corporate control" on corporate agents. 0 Even where banks own
equity in, but do not control, public corporations, the relative advantage of
banks in monitoring corporate behavior would benefit other stockholders. How-
ever, the principle works in two directions: permitting nonbanks to own bank
equity also would reduce inefficiency in bank management.
23'
B. Thinking About Alternative Regulatory Strategies
Analysis of the welfare costs of the separation of banking and commerce
suggests several lessons with implications for reform of the bank regulatory
system. First, any systematic reform of the laws separating banking and
commerce also should revisit the federal deposit insurance system. The principal
justification for the separation is that it ameliorates the tendency of federally
insured depositories to undertake excessive risks and suffer superoptimal rates
of failure. Ultimately, a balance must be struck between the desirability of
maintaining the existing deposit insurance system and suffering welfare losses
mediation. Both of the former mechanisms reduce market interest rates, decrease savings, and
increase consumption and, therefore, tend to be inflationary. Efficiency gains lead to both
increased savings and increased investment, with a disinflationary effect.
According to some authorities, restrictions on bank ownership of equity are an important
reason for the much lower cost of capital in Japan than the United States. See W. OUcHI,
supra note 8, at 62-90 (attributing lower cost of capital in Japan to close relationships between
Japanese banks and their corporate customers); Productivity Lag is Real Trade Barrier, Wall
St. J., May 14, 1986, at 30, col. 3 (listing bank ownership of equity in Japan as one reason
for Japan's high rate of capital formation). Assessment of this claim is difficult, however,
because of the much higher rates of savings in Japan (about 25% of gross domestic product
versus less than 5% in the United States), and imperfect international capital flows. Nevertheless,
even small differences in the costs of capital can generate staggering differences in wealth over
time, and differences in bank regulation undoubtedly have contributed to long-term shifts in
relative wealth among countries.
230. The notion that corporate acquisitions serve to check self-interested and socially costly
behavior of corporate officers originated with the seminal work of Henry Manne. Manne, Mergers
and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110 (1965) (discussing the economic
value of mergers prior to a situation in which bankruptcy or liquidation is imminent). Although
Manne's thesis enjoys widespread acceptance among academics, considerable skepticism exists
regarding the significance of the role of hostile takeovers as deterrents to careless or abusive
management. This skepticism is rooted in the low frequency and high costs of hostile acquisitions.
On average, successful tender offerors pay a premium of approximately 50016 over prevailing
market price for stock of target corporations, in addition to bearing substantial transactional
costs. See Separate Statement of Frank H. Easterbrook and Gregg A. Jarrell in Advisory
Committee on Tender Offers, Report of Recommendations 109-10 (Securities and Exchange
Commission, July 8, 1983). The size of the premium implies that the potential enhancement of
corporate value must be very large before a hostile takeover becomes feasible. Presumably, were
banks to become active in corporate control markets, the number of hostile acquisitions would
increase, with a concomitant increase in the deterrent effect on incumbent managements.
231. Direct empirical evidence exists for the latter proposition. The operating costs of
independent banks are lower in states that permit multibank holding companies, implying that
potential bank takeovers constrain agency behavior. See James, An Analysis of the Effect of
State Acquisition Laws on Managerial Efficiency: The Case of the Bank Holding Company
Acquisitions, 27 J. L. & Econ. 211 (1984) (examining empirically the importance of the outside
takeover device as a means of enforcing managerial efficiency).
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from policies-the separation or alternatives-that cause some misallocation
of bank assets, and that may distort the allocation of income between con-
sumption and investment. Second, bank risk regulation should focus more
sharply on the costs and benefits of integration of particular banking and
nonbanking businesses.
The separation is an indiscriminate blunderbuss, yet the social costs and
benefits of bank entry into new businesses may vary substantially among
particular nonbanking businesses. Likewise, particular banks vary considerably
in their degree of susceptibility to deposit insurance-induced moral hazard.
Publicly owned banks managed by salaried agents and banks with deep capital
will exhibit less of a tendency to undertake excessive risk. Modest efforts to
distinguish among subject banks and proposed activities offer potentially large
returns to economic welfare.23 2 Last, a principal goal of any regulatory reform
should be to permit greater latitude for market forces to shape the structure
and conduct of the banking industry. The capital intermediation process is
so significant-both in terms of assets and as a percentage of gross national
product (GNP)-that small gains in allocational efficiency are of significant
moment to the economy. Conversely, the administrative costs of bank reg-
ulation are very small relative to total banking assets. Thus, relatively large
increases in administrative expenses are more than offset by tiny improvements
in allocational efficiency.
The universe of possible regulatory strategies is large. The tendency of
insured banks to undertake superoptimal levels of portfolio risk could be
countered with a variety of devices, of which the separation of banking and
commerce is one with few apparent virtues. Any regulation that causes a
bank's indifference curve, I, in Figure 1, to become more convex or the
umbrella curve of feasible investments, D'D" in Figure 1, to become more
concave will shift the bank's optimal portfolio towards less risk.
1. Restrict Deposit Insurance
One reform measure consistent with the observed lesson would be to
restrict simultaneously the provision of federal deposit insurance and the scope
of nonbanking restraints. If the purpose of deposit insurance is to prevent
bank panics, that goal possibly could be achieved by an insurance system
limited to funds withdrawable on notice. As of the end of April, 1986,
transaction accounts immediately available on demand accounted for less than
twenty-two percent of commercial bank assets.23 3 Such accounts could be
232. In a model in which the social costs of restrictions on free allocation of bank capital
are balanced against the social costs of bank failure, the first-order conditions for a welfare
optimum would require that the marginal welfare gain from permitting entry by a bank into
any nonbanking business be equal to the social cost from any resulting increase in the expected
probability of the bank's failure. Because, inter alia, the marginal change in the probability of
failure depends on a bank's existing portfolio of assets, nonbanking restrictions of general
applicability cannot satisfy the first-order condition for a regulatory optimum. See generally
Santomero & Watson, Determining an Optimal Capital Standard for the Banking Industry, 32
J. FIN. 1267, 1279-80 (1977) (arguing against the regulation of debt leveraging by banks).
233. Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banking Institutions, 72 Fed. Reserve Bull., No.
7, Table 1.25, at AI8 (July 1986).
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restricted to specialized institutions subject to vigorous controls on excessive
risk-taking32" Other depositories financed entirely with equity and uninsured
debt would be unregulated. Most intermediation would be freed from the
distorting effects of both deposit insurance and the separation of banking
and commerce.
Experience with the money market mutual fund industry indicates that
deposit insurance may be unnecessary even for depositories accepting demand
deposits, if portfolio restrictions on such institutions were sufficiently strin-
gent. 235 Such restrictions could be enforced privately or publicly. If privately
enforced, a vestigial program of deposit insurance could be retained to relieve
depositors of the costs of monitoring institutional compliance. Even if omission
of deposit insurance caused some shifting of assets into demand accounts,
the volume of deposits subject to the separation still would be vastly smaller
than under existing law because of the difference in interest paid on demand
and other accounts. Uninsured accounts would bear no insurance premium
and suffer no portfolio restrictions; intermediaries offering demand accounts
would pay the costs of the deposit insurance system and would earn lower
rate of returns on their asset portfolios.
2. Introduce Risk-Related Premiums
Alternatively, deposit insurance could be retained, but it could be financed
by risk-related premiums, rather than a flat-rate levy. If portfolio risk were
assessed accurately and continually, and the insurance were fair actuarially,
banks would internalize all of the costs of risk-taking. Accordingly, they would
no longer undertake excessive risks, and the need for asset regulation would
disappear.23 6 More realistically, operational constraints will limit the regulatory
agencies to only the coarsest estimates of risk, and leave great latitude within
each category for opportunistic behavior. As a result, the premium differentials
among risk classes are likely to be smaller than necessary to eliminate moral
234. There should be no shortage of near riskless assets in which intermediaries offering
transactions accounts could invest. In addition to the national debt of more than $2 trillion,
the federal government guarantees another $410 billion of private debt. See 1986 CEA Report,
supra note 18, at 192.
235. See Kareken, Federal Bank Regulatory Policy: A Description and Some Observations,
59 J. Bus. 3 (Jan. 1986) (discussing the development of federal bank regulatory policy and how
well the present policies are working). Karaken proposes creation of a category of financial
intermediaries subject to two restrictions: (1) that the intermediary offer only transaction accounts
and (2) that its accounts be subject to "one hundred percent reserves," i.e., that the intermediary
be permitted only to invest in Treasury obligations. Id. at 37-42. Such intermediaries would
provide a risk-free transaction account for those who wished to hold their wealth in such a
form. Other intermediaries would not offer transaction accounts and would not be subject to
deposit runs; consequently they would not need deposit insurance. As an alternative, Karaken
points out that restricting the intermediary portfolio to marketable securities and constantly
"marking to market" the value of transaction accounts, i.e., constantly revaluing them to a
proportionate share of the fair market value of total assets, is a sufficient condition to avoid
bank runs. Even in the absence of deposit insurance, there still is no incentive to race to liquidate
transaction accounts, because the liquidation value of the account is not enhanced by being first
in line to withdraw funds. Id. at 43. The latter proposal would subject transaction accounts to
fluctuations in nominal, as well as real, value.
236. See supra note 174.
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hazard.237 Politically, risk surcharges may prove difficult to implement since
the result necessarily will entail higher premiums for precariously situated
banks .
23 8
3. Distinguish Well-Capitalized Public Banks
Even if the existing system of flat-rate deposit insurance is continued,
the separation should be suspended, in whole or in part, for institutions which
either are unlikely to favor excessive risk or, for other reasons, may have
particularly low expected probabilities of failure. The social gains, if any,
from the separation are less for depositories whose failure rate in the absence
of separation would be lower, and the optimal regulatory rule for more secure
intermediaries should shift toward greater firm autonomy. For example, relaxed
237. See 1984 CEA Report, supra note 102, at 166-67. If surcharges for portfolio risk are
less than actuarially fair to the insurance fund, low risk banks will continue to cross subsidize
high risk banks, albeit to a lesser extent. If undersized enough, risk-neutral insureds will have
an incentive to avail themselves of the riskiest possible portfolio. Figure 4 below, adapted from
Figure 1, graphically illustrates that the effect of risk surcharges is to rotate DD' towards NN'
to a position like SS". If the surcharges actuarially were fair, SS" and NN" would coincide.
If the surcharges are too small, S'S" still will continue to rise, and a risk-neutral depository,
i.e., one with horizontal indifference curves, will optimize its asset holdings by choosing the
portfolio comprised solely of the riskiest asset, represented by point S".
FIGURE 4
Risk-related premiums could be supplemented by deductibles or coinsurance insurance for
only a fraction of depositor losses, although the effectiveness of either of these measures would
be impaired by the historical inability of the insurance funds to tolerate losses of uninsured
deposits. See supra note 105. No current legislative proposal includes a provision for either
deductibles or coinsurance.
238. Congress already has demonstrated a propensity to further subsidize failing agriculture
and energy banks. See supra note 215.
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restrictions clearly are appropriate for depositories with high ratios of equity
capital to assets. Such institutions exhibit lower failure rates than more highly
leveraged banks for three interrelated reasons: (1) the greater capital provides
a cushion which makes it less likely that adverse outcomes will exhaust capital
and result in failure;219 (2) the return from superoptimal risk is lower for less
highly leveraged depositories and, therefore, they have less incentive to behave
imprudently; and (3) there is greater margin for regulatory detection and
intervention before institutional deterioration leads to collapse.
240 An obvious
improvement on the separation would be to permit a fraction of bank assets
that increases with a bank's capital-to-asset ratio to be committed to ownership
of equity or nonbanking businesses.2' Likewise, agency theory implies that
regulatory policy should distinguish between closely held and publicly owned
banks, since manager-controlled firms are less likely to take superoptimal risk
and less likely to fail. 242 To the extent that other nonbalance sheet factors,
239. The point can be demonstrated graphically using Figure 2. See supra text accompanying
note 179. An increase in the capital-asset ratio, C in Figure 2, lowers the intercept -C and
makes the line segments -CEA and -CE. steeper. The steeper the line segments, the lower the
probability of failure.
240. Numerous studies have documented the inverse relationship between bank capital and
subsequent probability of failure. See, e.g., J. SmIKEY, supra note 197, at 48-57 (stating that
these studies are being used in an attempt to predict financial difficuties of banks); Avery &
Hanweck, A Dynamic Analysis of Bank Failures, in Proceedings of a Conference on Bank
Structure and Competition, at 380 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 1984); Nelson, Risk in
Banking and Its Determinants: An Empirical Assessment, in Proceedings of a Conference on
Bank Structure and Competition, at 104 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 1979); Rosenberg
& Perry, The Fundamental Determinants of Risk in Banking, in Proceedings of a Conference
on Bank Structure and Competition, at 402 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 1978).
241. Since January, 1986, all four primary federal banking regulators, the FHLBB, the
Comptroller, the FDIC, and the Board, have offered plans for risk related capital requirements.
See 51 Fed. Reg. 16,550 (May 5, 1986) (FHLBB); Minimum Capital Ratios; Risk-Based Capital
Standard for National Banks, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,602*(Mar. 27, 1986) (OCC); Capital Maintenance;
Supplemental Adjusted Capital Proposal, 51 Fed. Reg. 6126 (Mar. 27, 1986) (FDIC); Bank
Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control; Capital Maintenance; Supplemental Adjusted
Capital Measure, 51 Fed. Reg. 3976 (Jan. 31, 1986) (Federal Reserve). Each agency proposes
to categorize assets into a small number of classes and to assign arbitrary weights to each class,
the weights increasing with assumed riskiness for the purpose of computing total assets for the
capital/asset calculation. The Board and FDIC proposals would supplement existing capital
requirements, thus increasing capital requirements for "risky" bank holding companies and state
banks. The Comptroller would replace existing regulation, thereby permitting additional deposit
leveraging by low-risk national banks. The FSLIC would revise radically existing regulation by
doubling the required thrift capital-to-assets ratio, but would allow certain "credits" for low
risk assets, and impose "incremental" capital requirements for certain high-risk assets. While
these proposals demonstrate an admirable, if belated, awareness of the theoretical nexus between
capital requirements and risk, they also evidence the regulatory preference for reduction in bank
failure rates. Three of the four proposals are necessarily more restrictive than current law, and
the fourth is likely to be more restrictive in practice. None of the proposals would relax any
of the provisions of the separation, regardless of the degree to which a bank's capital exceeds
the statutory minimum.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 184-185 (discussing the effects of management
control, agency, or risk taking). Professional managers in banking are more likely to exhibit
risk-averse behavior than managers in other trades, because of the unusual power of banking
regulators to punish them for adverse operating results or expecially risky, but legal, conduct.
Officers and directors of a failed bank, for example, routinely are required to resign by the
FDIC, although the bank may not be liquidated. Forrestal, Bank Safety: Risks and Responsi-
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such as competence of management, can be measured or assessed, these factors
might figure in the balancing.
4. Substitute Administrative Discretion for Statutory Restrictions
Finally, one can envisage replacing all or part of the current system of
line-of-business restrictions with a case-by-case administrative application pro-
cedure analogous to existing premerger antitrust review. Financial institutions
would apply to regulatory authorities to acquire a business or to purchase a
particular equity security. The application would include data regarding the
variances of the applicant's existing portfolio and the asset to be acquired,
and their covariance. A simple computation would indicate whether the result
of the transaction would be to increase or decrease portfolio volatility and
the applicant's probability of failure.
243
Various criteria can be imagined for adminstrative review of applications.
The most conservative approach would limit approval to transactions that
reduce bank portfolio variance or risk of failure. This, at least, would have
the virtue of rationalizing the separation by preventing its perverse application
in contexts where it promotes bank risk. Alternatively, one could set standards
that would permit acquisitions which increase institutional risk. Determination
of a risk ceiling should involve some consideration of the relative costs and
benefits of enforcement. Finally, banking regulators could weigh the costs
and benefits of particular acquisitions. While this is the theoretically preferred
approach, the banking regulators' track record raises doubts that they could
measure capably externalities or apply impartially such a test.
VI. CONCLUSION
While adoption of the separation of banking and commerce in the United
States occurred fortuitously, its subsequent expansion and refinement are due
principally to two presumptions: that separation is desirable to prevent financial
bilities, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev., August 1985, at 4, 10 (1985). Even where
risk-taking does not lead to insolvency, a reputation for aggressive asset management may subject
a professional banking executive to regulatory hostility and the possibility of various career
imperilling sanctions. A disfavored bank executive may be foreclosed from employment in newly
created banks, because regulatory authorities have the power to disapprove appointment of
corporate officers for a period after initial chartering. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(d)(3)(ii)(C)
(1987) (conditioning award of charter on agreement to permit the Comptroller to disapprove
appointment of any officer for a period of two years from the time that a national bank initially
commences business). Good relations with regulatory officials also are vital where bank operations
require discretionary regulatory approval, for example, to branch or to make a bank acquisition.
The particular incentive of professional bank managers to avoid conduct perceived as risky by
bank regulators may explain the significant negative correlation between bank size and probability
of failure, since larger banks are more likely to have diffused stockholdings and to be controlled
by professional management. Avery & Hanweck, supra note 240, at 386-90.
243. See supra note 173. Firm-specific data would be preferable to industry data for these
computations, because the latter understates the variance of individual firms, and insured banks
otherwise would have the opportunity to seek out firms with uncharacteristic risk patterns that
could increase portfolio variance. However, requiring firm-specific data would limit permitted
acquisitions to businesses of sufficient age to permit computation of the required statistics.
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panics, and that separation constitutes a necessary bulwark against the rise
of gigantic economic entities with unacceptable economic and political power.
Neither of these presumptions is correct. Federal deposit insurance has defused
the tendency of the banking system to experience episodic instability. Even
without deposit insurance, some financial intermediaries, such as money market
mutual funds, have avoided disequilibrium successfully by adopting restrictive
asset policies. Fear that abrogation of the separation would result in dominant
integrated firms is equally unfounded. The impetus toward aggregation of
financial and nonfinancial firms is less strong, as opposed to stronger, than
aggregation of nonfinancial corporations, and integrated organizations are apt
to distort political choices less, not more, than nonintegrated firms.
The separation does reduce somewhat the incidence of bank failure.
Whether this is a desirable goal is uncertain; it is apparent, however, that
bank regulators misperceive the costs and benefits of bank failure, and pursue
excessively the goal of bank "safety and soundness." Assuming, arguendo,
the appropriateness of the goal, reliance on alternative strategies and reductions
in the separation would promote social welfare.
